PFSCL XLIV, 86 (2017) La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” J OHN P HILLIPS (G LEN C OVE , NY) La Rochefoucauld 1 wrote two works 2 which are often studied together, the Maximes and the Réflexions Diverses, and whatever the differences in style, in genre, in purpose, in publication etc. both are regarded as works of Lar. the moraliste. One question that arises from studying these works together is whether they share the same view of the forces operative in the human psyche and of the difficulties created by these forces. Without addressing all the RD, the Max. and RDII “De la société” will be considered to see if a close examination can determine whether the two works share the same view of the human psyche. The 1678 edition of the Max. is used because as the last edition published by Lar., it consists of all that he wanted included as well as excluded. RDII is discussed both (a) because its topic (the possibility of honnêtes gens living together in some kind of harmonious société) is such that it should provide a clear though partial test case of whether the view of the human psyche in the Max. would allow for this type of society, and (b) because this RD has been used to suggest that the two works have compatible views of the human pyche. Though RDII recognises some of the same psychological complexities as those seen in the Max., it does not give them the same weight; it does not recognise that even to suggest establishing the society it proposes would require demonstrating how one could control not only one’s own amour-propre, intérets, selfdeceptions, etc. but those of others as well. Without providing this last element RDII would seem to have a view of the human psyche incompatible with that of the Max. 1 This work would not have been possible without the help of Georgette S. Kagan. 2 All references are to the edition of Truchet (Tr.). In order to save space several abbreviations are used: Lar. = La Rochefoucauld; Max. = Maximes, M. = maxime, RD = Réflexions diverses, RDII = Réflexion diverse II. John Phillips 140 Comments made by Robert Kanters 3 provide a useful starting point. According to Kanters (vii) the problem with which Lar. is concerned is the relations of “l’homme avec lui-même et avec les autres” (that is, the relation of amour-propre to amour d’autrui) and in his explication of Lar.’s thought, he presents one possible interpretation of the difficulties Lar. finds in the human condition that arise from this antagonism between amour-propre and amour d’autrui. Each of us (xi) resides in the “prison de son égoisme” as a “prisonnier perpétuel” of his “insatiable appétit”. And “notre moi le plus profond et le plus vorace” not only prevents us from forming relations with others, it is so reprehensible to us that it can not be acknowledged; not only must it be disguised by us from ourselves and from others, it also must be misrepresented to ourselves and others as virtuous. Real virtue, though rare and difficult of attainment, both exists and is essential for a society where we can “nous conduire honnêtement” with others, and where each individual must use the only “force...vertu...règle de notre conduite” which can improve our condition. It is necessary therefore that each individual employ (a) his or her “lucidité vis-à-vis nous-mêmes” to counterract the specific “mal vis-à-vis soi-même” (namely, the “mensonge qui nous rend dupe des apparences de la vertu”) and that each also employ (b) “la politesse (based on this lucidité) visà-vis les autres” to counteract the specific “mal vis-à-vis les autres” (namely, “la soif de domination et de possession”). He sees Lar. proposing in the Max. and in the RD a “morale” that allows for a “humanité difficile” however arduous this is to reach. Kanters’ remarks on lucidité and politesse clarify the question addressed here. If the Max. allow for the possibilty of a lucidité sufficient for the société and politesse proposed in RDII., the existence of this society would require that this lucidité lead to the ability to control or modify the internal forces, antagonistic to the formation of this society, brought to consciousness by this lucidité. These forces are the impulses, passions, etc., or, in the words of RDII. 185, the fact that “Chacun veut trouver son plaisir et ses avantages aux dépens des autres; on se préfère toujours à ceux avec qui on se propose de vivre, et on leur fait presque toujours sentir cette préférence; c’est ce qui trouble et qui détruit la société.” The Max. however do not seem to show any such power sufficient to control these forces 4 . It is possible to see in the Max. the potential for an individual to attain a high level of self-understanding, and thereby to come to an awareness of the myriad forces at work in the self, but this can not be made the foundation of the société of RDII; this société would require one not only to be aware of these forces, but also to be able to control one’s own amour-propre as well as that of others, or in the words 3 In his introduction (pp.vi-xx) to the Pléiade edition of Lar.’s works. 4 In fact many critics think that they show just the opposite. La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 141 of RDII. 185-186: “Il faudrait du moins savoir cacher ce désir de préférence, puisqu’il est trop naturel en nous pour nous en pouvoir défaire; il faudrait faire son plaisir et celui des autres, ménager leur amour-propre, et ne le blesser jamais”. Whatever lucidité is allowed for in the Max., it does not by itself seem sufficient to lead to the control necessary for the creation of the société of RDII. 5 As often noted, the Max. are not a systematic philosophical treatise but are best treated as a literary work, though one that is quite difficult to interpret. Not everything in the work is pessimistic nor is every maxime concerned with the insuperable difficulties of human life. The Max. do however present a picture of the human psyche such that the attainment of knowledge of one’s self seems particularly difficult if not impossible. Without knowledge of the self, it is not clear how we obtain control over the forces internal to the self which profoundly affect human thought and actions, and which are required by RDII to be controlled in order to create the society it proposes; the possibility of having genuine, honest interpersonal relations is severely hampered by these unacknowledged, powerful needs, drives, fears, anxieties, etc. And it can be argued that the obstacles which block self-knowledge are not religious 6 but psychological. The following footnote is meant to be a brief summary of ideas which might be generally accepted about the Max. view of the self. It is assumed that many maximes are discrete observations not necessarily indicating what happens on every single occurence of a specific concept (honneur, paresse, etc.) discussed. This is not meant to be an account of all aspects of the Max. but only to serve to emphasize and perhaps exaggerate some of the elements of 5 Campion (56,70) agrees with this point while Chariatte (63, 69, 106, 113-114, 116, 207, 211, 238, 252, 263, 268) disagrees. 6 Truchet (LXVIII-LXXI) has sound comments on the explicit religious references in the Max., noting that because he wrote a “livre profane” Lar. intentionally omitted the maximes he had written refering to religion (XXIII) though he had “raisons d’opportunité” to present his book in a Jansenist manner for the first edition. All these religious references were then dropped in part because he was interested in allowing the reader to interpret the book. Bénichou (14-15, 23-25) rightly remarks of those who wrote with a religious intention that “ils le disent”; this is not the case with Lar. Note that Kanters above opposes amour-propre to amour d’autrui and not to amour de Dieu, which seems to imply he thinks psychology is more important than religion. This last is the position of this paper. See perhaps also Louis Cognet, De la dévotion moderne à la spiritualité française, Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1958, p.102 . John Phillips 142 the psyche that would have to be accounted for in order for the society in RDII to succesfully exist. 7 7 Among the obstacles to knowledge of the self, and to control of it, is that our very volonté (M.297) is imperceptibly moved and turned by the body’s humeurs proceeding together in their course. Since the humeurs affect our volition in a way that is not available to perception, we can not understand what they make us want to do. They have a considerable part in all our actions, a veritable empire secret. Not knowing this nor how they affect our volition (and being (M.295) far from knowing all our volontés) it is hard to see how we could attain much knowledge or control of the self. And (M.45) the caprice of our humeur is more bizarre than that of fortune. In our coeur (which consists of so many logically, rationally incompatible elements that it defies comprehension by the human imagination (M.478)) there is a continuous creation of passions (M.10) such that the death of one is the creation of another, and what we (M.11) think we recognise as one passion (say audacité), has in fact been produced by its contraire (timidité). This activity is not within our control, and in part not even known to us. Since passions can be produced by their contraires it would be difficult to recognise and understand our own and others’ actions and thoughts and so account for our and their virtuous and non-virtuous acts. How long these passions last (M.5) is not within our control, suggesting we can not account for our behavior. We carefully manipulate (M.12) religiously and socially acceptable and esteemed appearances, for example of piété and of honneur, to hide passions we do not want others and perhaps ourselves to know we experience, but this is done in vain for these passions are nonetheless recognisable, visible to others and perhaps to ourselves. If the health of the âme (M.188) is comparable to that of the body, we could never be certain that the âme’s health is stable and guaranteed, since despite appearances to the contrary, it is always in danger of being emporté by passions, just as the healthy body can fall sick at any moment. Even successful resistence to passion (M.122) is not something for which our moral strength deserves credit as the success of the resistance is more often due to the weakness of the passion. If we can not recognise a passion operating in us, we can not be counted on to win out over passion whether by force or by reason. Since we do not know all that our passions make us do (M.460), it would be difficult to claim we know ourselves, and we can not claim to control what they make us do nor account for these actions. They impose actions on us without our knowing it. That we know our esprit (M.103) does not mean that we know our cœur, and in fact the esprit is (M.101) the dupe of the cœur, and so is less powerful and less useful than asssumed. The part of the psyche usually expected to be capable of the greatest understanding is thus deceived and misled by another part without realising it, thereby hindering knowledge and control of the self. We often think we are controlling our actions when they are being controlled by our cœur, yet we give credit to our esprit (M.43) for directing our actions when it is our cœur which makes us have this mistaken belief. We believe that esprit is leading us toward one but, yet though we can not perceive it, we are dragged by our cœur towards La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 143 another but. Believing that our esprit is in control shows that our esprit does not understand our coeur and that it is the dupe of the coeur. Often we do not want to know our self, to know who we are, nor do we want others to know this, and so we hide and disguise our self both from others and from ourselves. In order (M.256) to make people believe that we are what we want them to think we are, we create and wear a mine, an external appearance designed to produce in others the belief that this appearance is what we are, which is done to conceal what we think are bad or negative things. The world is only composed of mines, these false external appearances concocted by everyone to induce in all the belief that this external appearance is what each person is. This mutual deception perhaps raises the question whether anyone ever knows what anyone else really is, and suggests that since each of us does it, we may not believe that anyone is what their mine is and we may realise that we are not simply what our mine says we are. Whatever its origin, a situation (M.119) is created such that we so habituate ourselves to disguising ourselves from others to deceive them that we end up disguising ourselves from ourselves, with the result, and probably the intention, that we deceive ourselves. Most likely we disguise things we identify as giving to others and to ourselves a negative, shameful etc. view of us. Since this activity results in our hiding from ourselves some of the knowldege of ourselves we may have attained, it eliminates the possibility of gaining a more complete understanding of ourselves, as whether we fool others or not, we fool ourselves. We believe our own deceptions. We recognised, knew or suspected something negative, something not to be acknowledged, we hid it from others or made it appear to others as if it were not negative, until finally we ourselves no longer realised we were disguising something, we forgot it was negative and we believed it was good. We became the part we played. Deceiving ourselves (M.115) and being unaware we are doing so is easy, deceiving others is more difficult; they at least recognise they are being deceieved, and do so more easily than we recognise we are deceiving ourselves. One reason this may be true (M.114) is that we are inconsolable when deceived by enemies and betrayed by friends, but when we deceive and betray ourselves, we are satisfied, because our self-deception allows us to maintain the positive image of ourselves we think we must have. This suggests we have a kind of double standard. The feelings of outrage, of being wronged in regard to others betraying and deceiving us are not quite what they seem, since we have no such feelings towards ourselves when we do the same things to ourselves. Taking a moral stand against others (in both defense and proof of our “virtue” and “goodness”) when they do something we find morally reprehensible, is much easier than taking the same moral stand toward our own behavior when we do the same things, and do so in defense of our “goodness”. The limitations and difficulties suggested by the psychology of the Max. would make the requirements for relations in the society of RDII hard to meet. The lucid, honest examination of one’s own and other’s needs, fears, anxieties, etc, however limited, is essential for successful relations, but is often very much not desired, and in fact is actively resisted, as we all resemble the “fou d’Athènes” (M.92) in John Phillips 144 To examine this question, it is necessary to analyse RDII in detail and interpret it from the perspective of the Max. 8 One can then see the psychological expectations RDII has of its members, which may then be that it can be a shocking blow to learn that our favorable opinions of ourselves are just exaggerated (if not insane) wish-fulfillment fantasies divorced from reality, suggesting we would rather reject the truth than reject our fantasies. We have such (M.411) a need to hide our défauts that we invent means of hiding them which are less forgiveable than the défauts themselves. One might even say, in part ironically, that (M.36) nature gave us orgueil to allow us to avoid the douleur that comes from recognising our imperfections. If in helping others see and understand themselves as they really are, good and bad, we believe we are doing them a bienfait, they see it as a dangerous and unwelcome service (M.238, M.299, perhaps M.14). In fact (37) it is orgueil and not bonté which makes us critize the fautes of others, and we do not do this for their benefit, to help them, but to show them we do not have their fautes. And orgueil (M.462) not only has us blame fautes we believe we do not have, it actually makes us mépriser the good qualities we do not have. Each person (M.315) is usually unwilling to reveal the fonds of his cœur because of his défiance of himself, not of others. Each at times recognises his own défauts but when he can not corriger them, converts them into an honneur (M.442). And when we admit to défauts (M. 327) it is only the smallest ones and it is done to persuade others that we do not have the greater ones. Insight into others (M.132) is much easier than insight into oneself. Real sincérité (M.62), though worthy, is extremely rare, and what is usually encountered is a dissimulation to gain the confidence of others. In fact sincérité (M.383) is a way to keep attention on ourselves and control the way others see our défauts. A “realistic” image (M.116) of people giving and receiving conseils would show how much covert manipulation of each other there is as each seeks his own benefits. And pitié (M.88) for others is a careful apportionment of our sympathy based on what we calculate we will receive in the future if needed. Though we are not usually brave enough to admit it (M.397) we often have a rather Manichean view of ourselves and others, wherein we have no défauts, and others (whom we see as nos ennemis) have no good qualities. It is amour-propre which (M.88) measuring the satisfaction we get rates the bonnes qualités of our amis. 8 The conclusions of this paper are to some extent similar to those of A. Brunn (2015). Brunn sees the RD as tending to emphazise the difficulties encountered in trying to attain some kind of ideal of honnêteté. It is thus necessary to understand the RD as indicating the accommodations and compromises necessitated by the limitations of human nature. These limitations are those set forth in the Max. and the RD are a consideration of these limitations as they arise, for example in conversation, in langage, etc. Brunn does not see Lar. as prescribing behavior and so he does not see him proposing any “art de la conversation” but rather as presenting a warning about the traps and dangers which might await one in conversation. Clearly he is not suggesting the continuity claimed by the critics discussed here nor is he discussing in detail the shared assumptions of a single RD and the Max. La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 145 compared to those in the Max. RDII is composed of ten paragraphs (here designated I, II, III,...X) each of which generally stands on its own (with some overlapping) and this analysis will proceed paragraph by paragraph. The object is to point out the difficulties which arise if one claims the two works share the same assumptions about the human psyche, so no attempt is made to do justice to all possible readings of RDII. Although the narrator of RDII (I) is concerned only with the société of honnêtes gens and not with amitié, he dicusses without explanation amis (IV, V, IX). This perhaps implies that amis will be found in any society of honnêtes gens, and it does seem that some of the behavior required (IX) could only be expected from and for amis. It first seems the narrator is describing the requirements for any and all members of this society, but from III onwards it is suggested that he is primarily thinking of an individual said to have a certain superiorité vis-à-vis the others in the group. Though the narrator does not always stress this superiorité, it often seems (even in I and II) implied that the actions required are unlikely to be carried out by any member of the group. There will be then a person (or persons), superior to the other members, who will have to have escaped, or not been susceptible to, the psychological complexities and difficulties depicted in the Max. in order to behave as required in RDII, in order to be able to lead and instruct etc. the others, to ménager and not blesser their amour-propre, etc. According to RDII, it does not seem that this individual will in turn encounter other superior individuals who can behave toward him as he does toward others, nor that the existence and actions of such a superior individual need to be taken into consideration in the formation of this society so as to avoid tensions. Some readings of the Max. do not allow for such an individual whose superiority exempts him so consistently from the difficulties of the human predicament, and the narrator of RDII assumes that the good intentions of the superior one are in fact good and uncomplicated and so may be left unexamined, but this lack of examination might find little warrant in the Max. RDII (I,II) is concerned with a certain société and not with amitié. This société is necessary for all; no one can live without it. All desire this société (it is a plaisir) and search for it, though few are able to make it agréable and lasting. This société then is a desired good necessary and wanted by all yet unobtainable by most. RDII as a whole points to a desirable ideal to be attained, to the potential obstacles to attaining it, and to ways these may be overcome or avoided. Seen from the perspective of the Max., however, RDII poses obstacles for which RDII’s solutions do not seem sufficient. This société (II) is difficult to establish as each person wants his own plaisir and avantages, and at the expense of others. One always prefers one- John Phillips 146 self (se préférer) to others, and one almost always makes others feel (sentir) this. But this prefering oneself to others and making them recognise it disturbs (trouble) and destroys (détruit) the society one needs and desires. As each person has these incompatible, mutually self-defeating needs, to establish this society one must conceal one of the needs. Since one (the desire to prefer oneself) is so natural it cannot be changed, the other (making others feel one’s desire for self-preference) must be changed, must be concealed from others. One must therefore spare (ménager) the amourpropre of others and never wound (blesser) it. It seems that the individual (II) capable of controlling the amour-propre of others must be the superior one of paragraph III. The desire for selfpreference is closely related to the amour-propre of the Max. 9 but how this self-preference influences the members of this society is not understood in exactly the same way it is in the Max. The Max. do not indicate that one can consistently control one’s own amour-propre (nor how one could do so), let alone the amour-propre of others. Yet controlling one’s own amour-propre would presumably be a pre-condition for controlling that of others. It is unclear how easily amour-propre would consistently sacrifice or postpone its own pleasures as well as conceal its desire to prefer itself. It (II) seems reasonable to assume that even such an exceptional individual might have others attempting to exercise the same control over him, hiding their own desires for self-preference, managing, not wounding his amour-propre, etc. A situation would exist where some were manipulating others while in turn being manipulated, but how this would affect the establishment of this society is left unexamined. The Max. suggest that it would be crucial to examine the superior one’s motives for this kind of self-sacrifice; if these motives were claimed to constitute a simple, transparent self-sacrifice for the common good, it would be a rare event from the perspective of the Max. Paragraph III makes clear what this significant difference between some members and others consists of. Esprit is not sufficient to bring about this society unless supported by bon sens, humeur and mutual égards, as without these in harmony the unions formed are temporary. One can have a society with those to whom one is superior in naissance or other qualités, but only if this superiority is not misused against them. The superior one must almost never allow others to perceive this superiority; instead he should use it to instruire others, to make them realize they need to be conduit, and to lead them by raison, all while he [s’]accommoder as far as possible to their sentiments and intérêts. Here is a clear, significant division of the members of this society into two unequal groupings, one of which leads, instructs, 9 See for example Lafond (1977) 104, and Starobinski (1966) II 227. La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 147 manages etc. the other. Nothing is said about how the non-superior ones might experience and react to, even resist, the superior one, nor is mention made of problems this might cause for the establishment of this society, especially since the superior one might encounter others who were themselves superior. The basis for this superiority is either naissance or unspecified qualités personnelles, which suggests the characteristics traditionally associated with the French nobility; if so, one could anticipate finding many of the same problems which existed in the actual contemporary nobility. Nor do the Max. seem to assume that there are individuals who are capable of such control over others and sufficient control over themselves to be able to consciously and consistently modify their own sentiments and intérêts as here required. We do not learn whether the superior one needs to know and examine his own motives, nor the extent to which resorting to persuasion and deceit might be detrimental, since this society would be based on the deception of one part by the other. The next (IV) potential obstacle concerns freedom (liberté), but freedom and enslavement (servitude) primarily refer to the inconveniences members can cause by making demands on one another to participate in this society in ways they do not wish to, with a specific regard for the demands made on the superior one. This society, both necessary and desired, must allow each to participate or withdraw without constraint, indicating that the bonds between members are voluntary and chosen by each with a view to each one’s own interests; though this is not unexpected, it suggests doubts about the ultimate cohesiveness of the whole when one considers the demands made on each described in IX. The members (primarily the superior one) seem quite sensitive about what others may demand of them, fearing that they always will have to be available to see one another, to socialize together, to contribute to each other’s divertissement, etc. Though these activities are necessary, the absence of limitations can destroy what they are meant to preserve. The indulgence of others is necessary, but must appear to be given freely, implying it is not always so given. In fact the superior one has to make an effort to persuade others that, in following their sentiment, he is actually following his own. This resembles the earlier (II) necessary behavior, the need to ménager and not blesser the amour-propre of others. Again no explanation is given for how this would work, especially given the reluctance shown here (IV) concerning what others will require and demand. How it would be possible for the superior one to control the forces in his psyche in order to do this is not explained. And there is no comment on the deception of others, nor any on whether the motives for it are fully understood or simply assumed to be for the common good. John Phillips 148 Another obstacle (V) is how to handle the recognition of others’ défauts, specifically how the superior one can do this and not alienate them. For this society to function one must excuser the défauts of others, especially when they are innate and less important than their bonnes qualités. Deception is required because the superior one must not allow others to see he has been shocked by their défauts and he must ménager their amour-propre, so that not only do they not see that he has recognised their défauts and been shocked, but they must be led to think they themselves had noticed their own shortcomings. This is done so they may think, falsely, that they have seen and corrected these themselves. The Max. do not seem to envision the possibility of many such benevolent acts. It is difficult to see how the superior one could evaluate the défauts and good qualities of others without his own amour-propre, needs, and interests etc. playing a significant and ultimately distorting role. The superior one’s motives go unexamined, but a reader of the Max. would need to have explained how this individual is not seeing others through the prism of his own amour-propre etc., thereby introducing a host of obstacles to the creation of this society. Attention is not given to how others could be so easily deceived or misled, nor to the possibility that others might be deceiving and misleading him. If the Max. are at all concerned with disabusing people of their mistaken beliefs about themselves, deceiving others about the mérite they are tricked into thinking they obtain from recognising and correcting their own défauts, when they have done no such thing, seems to undermine the very notion of mérite. And this does not seem to be analagous to the Socratic aporetic irony, as this superior one more resembles an anti-Socrates (or the Xenophontic Socrates), as he thinks he knows what is best, hence his license to impose it. The superior one seems to have reached a more “enlightened” level of understanding than his fellows, with the result that the can simply cut through the Gordian knot of the human psychological predicament as depicted in the Max. Some individuals seem not have to struggle with the limitations inherent in the human condition, but having been given a dispensation, can manage others without having to take themselves into account. The next sections (VI,VII) point to two elements, essential to the functioning of this society, which protect against possible threats posed by its members to one another. Politesse (VI) and confiance (VII) can function as shields against disruptive events which may arise in conversation. When interlocutors express their opinions with too much vehemence and so unthinkingly let escape words which are unpleasant 10 and shock others or are themselves shocked, politesse allows for the hearing of raillerie in such a 10 See for example Brunn (2009) 151ff. for a discussion of how raillerie was viewed in France as well as in Europe at this time. La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 149 way as to avoid this unpleasantness. It may also (VII) happen that the members of this society experience fear because of what others say by imprudence, hence the need for confiance shared by all and producing in all an “air de sureté et de discrétion” which can lead to never having to be afraid or to cause others to feel fear. Here (VI,VII) it does not seem the superior one alone poses these dangers, as these are things all might experience or cause others to experience, but certainly the one able to conduire, instruire etc. others might be the one most likely to produce this shock, this fear. We are not told how anyone with the psychology described in the Max. could successfully, consistently exercise the control of the self required here. Shock and fear are likely to cause real, significant psychological tension and create situations requiring considerable self-knowledge and knowledge of others in order to be managed. The shock and fear potentially caused (IX) by careless speech are real threats to the existence of this society, threats which, though only hinted at here, seem to suggest the hidden and destructive forces of the Max. To emphasize the importance of mutual pleasure for this society, an image (VIII) illustrates the necessity for variety in the production of this pleasure. Different ways to achieve this are acceptable as long as all aide au plaisir de la société and meet the outcome aimed at, namely, to resemble the justesse of the voix and the instruments found in music. But the more closely one examines this image, the more it points to the difficulties inherent in these attempts to establish and maintain such a society. Musical instruments are mechanical man-made objects, human beings are not and so may not be as easily manipulated, though the human voice does allow for some measure of control. A musical production involving voices and instruments assumes there is someone who manages and directs all, again suggesting there is someone in this society who is somehow exempted from the “dissonances” likely to be produced in any group whose psychology resembles what is seen in the Max. While instruments which do not harmonize could be made to do so, this would not require the instruments to be “willing” to suppress or modify their own “plaisir” for the sake of the group, since being inanimate they would have no such inclinations. For the members of this society, however, for whom mechanical adjustments are impossible, the crucial question would be how amour-propre is ménagé and not blessé. This image omits the tensions that would arise in this society because it ignores the question of whether all can have that preference for self, which can not (II) be eliminated but must be concealed, without there arising insoluble conflicts. Considered from the perspective of the Max. this indicates how precarious the whole enterprise proposed in RDII is. The superior one is supposed to be capable of entering into the deepest replis of John Phillips 150 the cœur of others, though it is not clear that he has the necessary selfawareness or a clear sense this would be as dangerous for him as for the others. The dangers inherent in what he is trying to do are presented as if the risks were neglible and only faced by those without this superiority. People often do not have the same intérêts (IX) so the douceur of society is most easily achieved if individuals do not have ones that are contraires. It is best when the superior one can be utile for his amis, can spare (épargner) their chagrins, can show that he shares these with them, and either turn their thoughts away from theses chagrins or remove them. At least he must replace the chagrins with agréable things which would more pleasantly occupy their minds. It is through speech (parler) that he must approach matters which are important for them provided they allow (permettent) this, while keeping in mind that politesse and humanité require that he should not “entrer trop avant dans les replis de leurs cœurs”. It is painful (peine) for them to allow others to see what they know is hidden in their replis, and even more painful when others penetrate to matters they themselves do not know are there and expose these to them and to others. This society affords its members an infinite number of topics to talk about sincèrement but almost no one has the qualities (docilité, bon sens) needed to receive the advice required to sustain this society. Each wants to have insight into himself and the replis of his cœur but only in some areas, not in all, because each is afraid to know “toute sorte de vérité”. Replis du coeur (IX) would include what in the Max. are the forces operative in the human psyche including both those one does not know about and those one does not want to know about. These would include, for example, the forces that lead one to believe that one’s motives are virtuous when they are not, forces of which one is unaware yet which exert control over one’s actions and thoughts even as one imagines one is acting on the basis of conscious volition, as well as the usual varied fears, anxieties, internal conflicts, animosities, self-deceptions, and deceptions and exploitations of others etc. The superior one does not need to be on guard against others seeing things in the replis of his cœur which he can not or does not want to discuss, or of which he is unaware or which cause him fear. Since he is able to participate in and direct these discussions without fearing that his own amour-propre, intérêts, etc. might have a disruptive and destructive effect, he must have a level of control over these forces which does not seem to be provided for in the Max. The unspecified chagrins (IX) experienced by the amis would include many powerful and negative feelings, etc., things which might have been hidden from others and even from themselves, perhaps the most difficult things humans experience. The superior one undertakes to be utile to his La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 151 friends in regard to these chagrins without having been asked to do so but knowing he must get permission, though it is unclear what meaningful permission they could grant concerning things unknown to them. Sparing the amis these chagrins probably includes preventing them from fully experiencing them as well as sharing them when they can not be eliminated. This sharing would involve lessening the negative effects of these chagrins, replacing them with less unpleasant objects which can serve as a distraction, but in doing so the superior one would also experience these painful, negative things partially or vicariously, and so would have to be able to carefully control his own desire for self-preference and could not simply look to his own pleasure. This seems a dangerous activity, potentially disruptive of the harmony sought in this society if done incorrectly. There are limits to what one is willing and able to know because of the frightening vérités known or suspected to exist in the replis du cœur, vérités of which one may be unaware but which nevertheless can be perceived by others, vérités hidden for good reason. Some of these probably are such that it is almost impossible to bring them to the level of consciousness or discussion. With such fears and so much unknown and given the psychological assumptions of the Max., it is difficult to see how this could consistently come off well; no one knows enough, no one controls enough to do this safely. RDII ends with a comparison. Just as it is necessary to keep the appropriate distance in order to see objects correctly, so it is necessary to maintain the appropriate distance from the members of this group in order to establish and maintain this society. This is because each person has a point de vue from which he wants to be regardé; one often has raisons why one does not want to be éclairé too closely, almost no one wants to always and in all things let himself be seen such as he actually is. As was true of the earlier image (VIII) the lack of a clear correspondance between this image and what it is meant to clarify suggests difficulties inherent in the establishment of such a society. The need to maintain distance to see objects is not the same as the need to maintain distance from members of this group to preserve this society. Objects do not have emotional relations with each other or with human observers, and do not make demands on people observing them. Objects do not hide things, have nothing to fear, nothing to conceal, no opinion about how they are viewed; they have no chagrins, no replis de cœur, they do not form a société. In the Max. one sees plenty of occasions where people do not want to know, or are not able to know, too much about themselves, and they too have raisons. They have powerful reasons to try to make sure they are only seen by others from a perspective they themselves have carefully tried to manage, since they believe it is John Phillips 152 essential to control the opinions others have of them, in order to influence or deceive others and often to deceive themselves. The Max. seem to view deception and self-deception in such areas as a constant inherent temptation and danger and as a result they insist on the necessity for questioning, examining and mistrusting one’s raisons. Since human limitations can neither be ignored nor eradicated, the Max. emphasize the importance as well as the difficulty of attempting to determine what can and should be known and seen, and why or why not, as part of the project of achieving whatever degrees of lucidity and déniaisement are possible. When RDII is examined from the point of view of the Max., though many of the psychological difficulties shown to be facing man in the Max. are explicitly or implicitly present, what is not present is any suggestion that RDII shows how to master or modify these psychic forces so as to allow for the achievement of this necessary and desired société. In turning to studies of Lar., some critics 11 have not commented on this matter, some think that the Max. and RDII as well as the other RD are not compatible 12 , and some think they are. Here attention will be given to some who disagree with this paper’s thesis, especially to the analyses of J. Lafond as the most important critic of Lar. As stated, it might seem a mistake to treat in such detail works so different in genre, in tone, in purpose and in terms of publication, but perhaps a detailed analysis will bring to the fore the difficulties which have to be resolved if one is to claim that the works share essential psychological assumptions. All discussions of these critics assume that the above analysis of RDII is kept in mind. Lafond’s thorough, influential analysis of Lar.’s work, though not simply concerned with the relationship between these two works, has observations pertinent to this paper 13 . His account of Lar.’s overall purpose does not support this paper’s thesis, as he does not think that the psychology of the Max. is incompatible with a société such as that proposed in RDII. In both works Lar. is seeking a “sagesse humaine”, part of an “honnêtete”, an “art de vivre en société” which includes a requirement to “s’accommoder de l’amourpropre d’autrui par la limitation volontaire du sien” 14 . Lar.’s “système de l’amour-propre” and its extension “la théorie de l’honnêtete” are meant to lead the reader to realise that all purely human hope of reaching some real “sagesse” will be insufficient and so one must turn to religion (211); however Lafond’s analysis of the amour-propre etc. of the Max. does not sufficiently demonstrate how this very amour-propre does not in fact 11 See for example Adam and Barthes. 12 See for example Rosso and Doubrovsky. 13 See for example Lafond (1977) 68, 73, 160, 163, 165, 167, 183, 192. 14 See Lafond (1977) 211. La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 153 preclude the accomplishment of this religious purpose 15 . That Lar. has a religious intent is part of Lafond's argument for the compatibility of the two works but some of his support for this intention may be weaker than he supposes. One text which he (67-68, 73, 160, 183, 184, 185, 190, 197) relies on heavily is a letter 16 Lar. wrote to Thomas Esprit. Lafond says this letter contains the definitive proof of the intention of the Max., which is to denounce “les vertus des anciens philosophes” so as to show that men “lorsque la foi ne s’en mêle pas” can have only the false appearance of virtue. This letter is said to “justifier” (160) the harshness of Lar.’ view of human nature because 17 “l'on n’a pu trop exagérer les misères et les contrariétés du coeur humain pour humilier l’orgueil ridicule dont il est rempli et lui faire voir le besoin qu’il a en toutes choses d’être soutenu et redressé par le christianisme”. The intention of the Max. is to show man his “impuissance à se sauver par luimême pour n’attendre son salut que de la religion”. This same quote clarifies (183) the “finalité implicite” of the Max. by showing man his need for “la seule solution véritable, la solution chrétienne”. But not enough consideration is given to the time and circumstance of the writing of this letter, which Grubbs 18 details. It was written when Lar. was very worried about the reception the Max. would get; because many of the initial readers had a negative reaction 19 he sought the approval of others in order to better defend his work 20 . The letter shows 21 that Lar. wants Thomas Esprit to think Lar. and J. Esprit produced the Max. in collaboration, as Lar. is trying to avoid taking full responsibilty. It seems clear from this letter, from the sondage he had Mme de Sablé take, and from the letters to and from her and others, that Lar. was quite anxious about the work’s reception, perhaps in part because of the troubles caused by the pirated edition of his Mémoires. And whatever borrowing from J.Esprit 22 he might have made, he never published anything with him, and what J. Esprit published much later is a very different, entirely religious work. Lar. also twice writes that changing the ordre of the Max. would answer critics’ objections, which does not seem 15 See for example Lafond (1977) 38 where he claims one can “ménager l’amourpropre des autres”. 16 Tr. 577-579, 6 February 1664. 17 Tr. 578. 18 Grubbs (1932-33) 26-28, 32-34. 19 Grubbs 32. 20 Note for example as signs of Lar.’s concern his use of the words peril, salut, criminelles, indicating he thinks the accusations are serious. 21 Grubbs 27. 22 Grubbs 26-27. John Phillips 154 an effective response. In addition Lafond’s view does not allow for possible modifications in Lar.’s intentions even though he never published maximes showing any religious intentions, dropped MS.1 and the Préface by La Chapelle-Bessé, changed the first Avis au lecteur, and continued writing and modifying for another dozen years or so. And significantly, since this letter was never published and probably was not seen by many if any readers, whatever purpose it served beyond trying to influence Thomas Esprit, it can not have been effective in indicating to readers the “finalité implicite” claimed by Lafond. The letter even implies that Thomas Esprit himself did not see the Max.’s religious purpose but had to have it explained to him. 23 23 Plazenet is in her edition not particularly concerned with the relation of the Max. to RDII but she does say (36) that RDII’s société is simply a “traffic d’intérêts” which has many of the negative elements found in the Max. (the rule of amour-propre, the need for variété and divertissement, etc.) and so is not approved of by Lar., who is just providing rules for getting along in this commerce. She is however, even more than Lafond, whom she follows in many points, certain that Lar. writes with a religious intention (a “vocation apologétique” 113) but she too leaves unexamined some of the same things Lafond does. She often cites (e.g. 12, 15, 28, 37, 47) contemporaries of Lar. who support their ideas with explicit references to Dieu, to Christian ideas and dogma, etc. but without explaining how significantly different this is from what Lar. does. Thus the Max. are related to the Pensées in their “intention religieuse” (59); the Max. are written by Lar. as a “prélude à la conversion”, a “propédeutique” (69) of “la vie chrétienne” for “honnêtes gens” (70). She thinks (47-48, 50-51, 60) that Lar. was significantly influenced by the ideas of Pascal’s apologétique, which claim she says is supported (50), surprisingly, because Lafond in his book (1977) refers to Pascal more than to any other author. In fact (70) Lar. was “le disciple” of Saint-Cyran who was “le maître”. She discusses much of the explicitly religious material Lar. rejected and claims (18) that the “lucidité” of the Max. is the first step toward “Vérité” with an initial capital letter. She claims however that the religious material was rejected by Lar. because of (20) his “profonde révérence envers la religion”. But her account (11-26) is puzzling. She presents a Lar. who in his writings is initially very explicit about his religious intention but who then eliminates the religious references out of respect for religion because he wants to present himself as not explicitly religious; this is done because (1) as a “duc et pair” it is against bienséance to act as a “directeur de conscience” and (2) on literary grounds because authors thought it best to avoid a mélange of genres and régistres. Yet we are told that he is also leading readers toward “Vérité”, that he is in effect saturated with the ideas of St. Augustin and augustinisme, and that many of those around him were very clear about the religious intention of his writing. This seems like having it both ways at once: he does not think he should be a guide but he is leading others toward “Vérité” and almost everyone knows it, yet he then presents himself as not being explicit about his religious intentions. She also (75) is not clear about how the letter he wrote to Thomas Esprit fits into this. If the Max. were obviously Christian and since if all La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 155 Lafond claims that the Max. and the RD are not in opposition to, or in contradiction with, one another but are unified 24 . To support this he treats all of the extant written material, what was rejected or suppressed or never meant to be published, as of equal value to what was published. Lafond then bases his argument several times on the Préface written at Lar.’s request by La Chapelle-Bessé, and he does this even though Lar. expressed dissatisfaction with it in a letter and dropped it after the first edition, though we do not know why he did so. Lafond claims it was originally included because Lar. was worried about how the Max. would be received outside Mme de Sablé’s circle, but he could drop it once he had seen the reception was such he did not need it. A. Adam 25 for example thinks he may have done so because it made him seem too much of a Jansenist; there may well have been other grounds for rejecting it 26 . As an example, Lafond 27 refers favorably to the section of the Préface (Tr. 272) concerning the besieged town and claims the comparison shows that, just as the besieged residents must be content with fake money produced in the town, so must we “sur le plan humain” be content with the “apparences” of virtue as this is the best that may be obtained in a fallen world. But examined in detail, La Chapelle-Bessé’s image does not work well, which may have been one of the reasons Lar. rejected it. The faith of the besieged in fake money is not dependent on their “misère”. They know they are besieged, they know what real money is and used it without ambiguity, they know this is fake money and why it is so, and are not harmed or deceived by it. It is only for exchange purposes and almost anything could serve as well under the circumstances. They would be happy to return to real money when the siege ended. They do not believe the fake money is real money and they do not others around Lar., especially his Jansenist friends, knew this, Esprit would have known it as well and Lar. would have little need to explain his religious orthodoxy. 24 See for example (1977): 97 they are unifiés; 102 they are the same and there are no contradictions; 107 the “éthique” of the RD is complementary of the “vue critique” of the Max. as both works have the same “vue”; 146 there is not opposition between the “sagesse positive” of the RD and the “critique négative” of the Max.; 160 Lar.’s ideas and especially his “augustinisme” are remarkably consistent from the earliest maxime to the latest RD; 176 his “notion d’amourpropre” is central in the “anthropolgie” of the Max. and the RD; 183 “amour-propre” is the center of “la Réflexion” in the RD and the Max., etc. 25 Adam vol. IV p. 100, n.1. 26 Lafond, 1989 (171) says the Max. must be seen as only psychological if one rejects the Préface, because in doing so one loses their true “finalité”, which is to “se convertir”. Lar. however rejected this Préface. 27 See (1977) 147, n.118 and his Folio ed. (1976) 15. John Phillips 156 have to think so; it is a temporary man-made expedient devised to serve a fixed limited purpose. The comparison does not support the point Lafond claims Lar. is making 28 and undermines his interpretation. It is further noteworthy that both the Préface 29 and the first Avis adopt a rather harsh tone in relation to those who criticise the Max., a tone which disappears after they are dropped since the tone of the Avis of the second and following editions is different. Lafond asks (162-163) whether it is possible to know when Lar. was most sincere, when he excluded or included the explicitly religious material (such as the Préface). This last is unhelpful since if one does not judge Lar.’s work (or that of any author) by what he himself chose to publish and to omit, one is claiming that Lar. did not know what he was doing or needed to do, did not know how to shape his own work. Though many critics analyse Lar.’s work in a similar manner, it would seem that great caution is needed in using the unpublished RD as well as maximes and elements purposely rejected, material which the author chose not to publish, to argue for the meaning of the Max., since Lar. himself edited and published them several times 30 . We know almost nothing about the RD except that Lar. chose not to publish them 31 ; we do not know why he did not do so, and we do not know what if any additions, subtractions or modifications he might have made. It does not seem that any contemporary commented on them 32 . It is, without explicit justification, perhaps unfair 33 to assume that Lar. intended the reader to be able to infer from the RD the relationships between them and the Max., or that the meaning of the Max. was incomplete without the unpublished RD and without the other unpublished and rejected material such as the Préface. What Lafond does not seem to allow is that Lar. intentionally did not want the RD and the other material to be published. It would have been helpful if Lafond had included further analysis of the different Avis au lecteur as these are used in support of his religious interpretation. He claims (124) that Lar. included the Avis of the first 28 It is also odd that the Préface (Tr. 274) says that the author is not doing the same thing as the ancient Stoics but “c’est de l’homme abandonné à sa conduite qu’il parle et non pas du chrétien”. 29 Tr. 276-277, 282. 30 See the comments of Truchet p. xxviii-xxix. 31 Lafond is quite clear (196) that it is not known whether the RD would have been changed or ever published. 32 See Tr. p. xxvii-xxix concerning this “petit mystère”. 33 Parmentier (48) points out that the fact that the Max. and the RD are printed together can lead one to overestimate the importance of the honnête homme in the Max. La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 157 edition 34 and the Préface because once the work was read outside Mme de Sablé’s circle, he wanted to be sure it would be correctly understood. Once that had happened, he could and did drop the Préface as well as replace the Avis of the first edition with that of the second, which is virtually identical with the Avis of all the following editions 35 . The first Avis (162) was used by Lar. to justify the work as religious, to show that it was “l’abrégé d’une morale conforme aux pensées de plusieurs Pères de l’Eglise”. But comparison with the replacement Avis shows that the first Avis was quite defensive in tone and resembled the Préface. Both were written when Lar. was most anxious about how his work would be received, and both the first Avis and the Préface are quite critical of those who found fault with the Max., accusing them of being hypocrites or of being dishonest about acknowledging hard truths about themselves, but Lafond does not comment on this. Furthermore, more analysis is needed concerning the significance of the omission of the first Avis occuring simultaneously with the omission of MS.1 36 and of the Préface in light of the fact that the replacement Avis does 34 Tr. 267-268. 35 Tr. 5. 36 We do not know why Lar. dropped MS.1 after the first edition but its omission probably affects Lafond’s religious interpretation of the Max. The history (Plantié 561-573) of the various contexts MS.1 appeared in is important. Since it was originally addressed to a religieuse, the religious background at the time it was written would be clear and she (and other readers knowing it was addressed to this religieuse) would have been able to understand how the description of the fiendishly deceptive amour-propre might affect the religious life (for example, the references to “gens de piété”), even for someone who had renounced the world. MS.1 would have become less clear in its meaning as it moved to Sercy’s collection where the name of the dedicatee was removed; when it was moved from there to the 1665 edition, where it was the first maxime in the collection and where it was no longer directed to a “religieuse”, and where it was no longer presented as a personified amour-propre warning a religieuse; and it was then omitted from the second edition onwards. Originally, though treating a serious matter, it had an element of playfulness and fantasy. The fact that “Amour-propre” itself was writing a religieuse a letter warning her about the dangers of amour-propre, and referring to itself in the third person, makes clear that it was a fiction; how for example could such a chaotic and irrational entity write a letter, and one that warned about itself? It is also significant that when Lar. drops MS.1, the second Avis au lecteur replaces the first (which unlike the second, refers to amour-propre several times) and also drops the Préface of La Chapelle-Bessé (with its references to amour-propre as well as its references to Christianity). And of course the religious maximes were never published by Lar. And Lafond’s claim (1988, 101) that MS.1 always was essential to Lar. because he published it twice, 1659 and 1665, fails to consider that the first publication was in a specifically religious context and after the John Phillips 158 not use the expression amour-propre, which occurs three times in the first Avis as well as in MS.1 and in the Préface. Several important things occur about the same time: the religious maximes are suppressed, the Préface with its support for a religious interpretation is dropped, the first Avis with its echo of the religious defense of the Préface (for example, the “Pères de l’Eglise”) is dropped and the long maxime (MS.1) originally addressed to a “religieuse” and treating amourpropre in a religious context (for example, the phrase “gens de piété”, which was later changed) is also eliminated. The replacement Avis 37 does not mention amour-propre, and has become vaguer about religion, referring to the apparently nearly all-inclusive group of those “dans cet état déplorable de la nature corrompue par le péché” as well as to a group excluded from any criticism in the work, namely “ceux que Dieu en préserve par une grâce particulière” 38 . Lafond (167-168, 167, n.194) in explaining how Lar.’s “augustinisme” was “rigoureux” in some instances but also at times rather nuanced because it allowed for a compromise with “les valeurs mondaines” usefully quotes a written response from Jean Orcibal to Lafond’s question about what Lar. might have meant by “grâce particulière” in the replacement Avis: “Vous voyez donc que l’orthodoxie (sur ce point de la grâce) est une pointe d’épingle et que les formules de Lar. sont trop vagues pour permettre de le classer dans une école théologique. C’est toutefois au gomarisme qu’il fait le plus penser [...] mais sa formule est assez large pour être approuvé par les molinistes soucieux de ne pas tomber dans le pélagianisme”. We do not know what Lafond wrote nor what else Orcibal may have written, but Lafond says that “gomarisme” is to Protestantism what Jansenism is to “christianisme” and so Lar. is therefore referring to “extrémisme augustinien” but in such a way that it can be accepted by “les tenants de l’orthodoxie”. No evidence of Lar.’s interest in Gomarism nor any reason why he would be alluding to “gomarisme” (and it does not seem the Orcibal claims Lar. is alluding to this) is supplied by Lafond, whose interpretation of this serves to eliminate Lar.’s vagueness. It is noteworthy that Orcibal does not say the phrase refers to jansénisme or augustinisme 39 . Since he singles out the vagueness of Lar.’s phrase and its applicablity to Molinists, it is possible that Orcibal thinks that second publication it was dropped from all four following editions. This is not to say that amour-propre does not remain an essential notion for the Max. as a whole, but it is not clear that Lafond has explained how these changes fit his interpretation. 37 Tr. 5 or 373-374. 38 Tr. 5. 39 On the other hand Sellier “Qu’est-ce … jansénisme (1640-1713)? ” 78 thinks this refers to specifically Augustininan ideas. La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 159 Lar. is less interested in the niceties of different theological schools and more interested in simply including everyone and thereby protecting himself from attack. Orcibal’s comments then would clarify why the changes Lar. made here resemble the changes he made in dropping the first Avis and the Préface, namely, they show that Lar. still wanted to obviate potential criticism on religious grounds. One wonders what this indicates about those who were confident enough to openly or secretly think the phrase “ceux que Dieu en préserve par une grâce particulière” applied to them, and also how many such people there were. As in the first Avis an escape route is implicitly provided for those sure of the purity of their motives (who could thus avoid applying the Max. to themselves), but here there is no explicit criticism of these readers. Without some comment, Lafond’s use of this material for the religious intention of the Max seems weakened. As a further step to reinforce his interpretation of Lar.’s religious purpose, and also reinforce his claim that the Max. and RDII are compatible, Lafond often draws extensive parallels between parts of Lar.’s work and passages from Pascal, Nicole, J. Esprit, etc. 40 Finding parallels among contemporary authors is a legitimate and common critical tool, but Lafond uses passages from authors who are thoroughly and explcitly Christian, and who explicitly invoke Dieu, grâce, péché, etc., in order to justify the alleged Christian meaning of passages in Lar. which not only have no religious reference but where religious material has at times been systematically removed 41 . Since Lafond’s citations are less than persuasive and seem rather to call even more attention to Lar.’s omission of such material 42 , this approach does not help to clarify the relationship of the Max. to RDII. 43 In one passage where Lafond refers (52-57) directly to RDII he discusses how, though the RD generally depict société as an “âge de fer” full of lies and inadequacies, they still show (quoting RDII 185) how société, so “nécessaire aux hommes”, can have a “valeur positive” (53). He says that Lar. thinks that though “honnêtete” is often only a matter of appearances, there is an 40 This of course is not meant to call into question Lar.’s debt to Augustinianism which Lafond and Sellier have so clearly demonstrated. 41 See for example Lafond (1977) 68, 73, 160, 161, 163, 165, 167, 183, 192. 42 Lafond also claims (1989, 161) that one can learn Lar.’s “intention” by reading La Fontaine’s poem (I, 11) “L’Homme et son image”. See also Lafond (1983, 205) for the claim that an explanation of Lar.’s idea of overcoming the resistance of amourpropre is also found in La Fontaine. Having to interpret other writer’s poems in order to understand Lar. would make a difficult task more difficult, and even if one knew Lar. agreed with this method, how would one know which interpretations were correct? John Phillips 160 “honnêtete” which is authentic and similar to “amitié” (RDII 185), and the conditions necessary for the existence of this “société d’honnêtes gens” are spelled out in RDII. These include matters related to esprit, to individual liberty, to “moeurs”, to “politesse”, to “confiance”, to “mesure” etc. This “honnêtete” is an “art de plaire” but to achieve this one must suppress one’s own amour-propre because (RDII 185) “Chacun veut trouver son plaisir et ses avantages aux dépens des autres; on se préfère toujours à ceux avec qui on se propose de vivre, et on leur fait presque toujours sentir cette préférence”. This shows that amour-propre is the essential cause which (RDII 185-186). “...trouble et détruit la société”, but Lafond claims that RDII also shows that the remedy for this is that “Il faudrait du moins savoir cacher ce désir de préférence, puisqu’il est trop naturel en nous pour nous en pouvoir défaire; il faudrait faire son plaisir et celui des autres, ménager leur amour-propre, et ne le blesser jamais”. Lafond justifies these interpretations of “honnêtete”, of amour-propre “ménagé” etc. by a discussion of Mitton’s views about these ideas as well as those of Pascal. He says that Lar.’s “honnête homme” is a person of “raison” and so therefore, by virtue of M.139, will have a “respect” for “la préférence des intérêts d’autrui aux siens” (though these last words are not in M. 139). This will require discretion as (RDII 188) “il y a de la politesse et quelquefois même de l’humanité à ne pas entrer trop avant dans les replis de leur cœur” because “Comme on doit garder des distances pour voir les objets, il en faut garder aussi pour la société; chacun a son point de vue, d’où il veut être regardé”. But in light of the above reading of RDII, Lafond’s does not explain how the compatibility of the views of the human psyche in the Max. and in RDII is not called into question by his interpretation. Since the Max. do not show how the amour-propre, etc. of the human psyche could be controlled or ignored to the extent Lafond claims is necessary, he would need to make clear why and how he thinks this is possible. He himself has analysed the potential substantive difficulties that follow if one tries to suppress one’s amour-propre, or to “cacher ce désir de préférence” or to “ménager” and not “blesser” the amour-propre of others, yet this is what is necessary for RDII to produce the société it proposes. Finding parallels in Mitton and Pascal is not helpful, since Mitton’s view of the powers of amour-propre are much different than those of Lar., and Pascal is explictly and emphatically Christian and believes in a Christian “solution”. In another section where Lafond (101ff.) refers to RDII he argues against the interpretation (represented for example by Bénichou and Starobinski), that once the true nature of amour-propre, as seen in the Max., has been demonstrated and accepted, one is forced (in order to find in Lar. a “morale positive”) to advise people to “dissimuler”, but this dissimulation will now be a fully consciously acknowledged choosing of the “mensonge social”. He La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 161 rejects this interpretation that the Max. present the negative analysis of the human condition, while the RD present the positive analysis of the same condition, because he claims there is no contradiction between the two works. He (102) claims that “...de la Maxime 202…aux Réflexions diverses II à IV” “honnêtete” is consistently a search for authenticity; thus (104) it is not an attempt to disqualify “sincérité” when Lar. says that it is necessary to “cacher en société cet amour-propre qui lui faire ‘trouver son plaisir et ses avantages aux dépens des autres’” (RDII 185). He claims that Lar.’s view of “la raison classique” (as seen in RDXIII) implies that man can “se connaître et controler son action”; therefore life in société is not based on “dissimulation” but on “plus d’effort moral” which is both necessary and possible in order to not “infliger à autrui certaines blessures”. But he does not cite and analyse maximes showing how any “effort moral” or any other effort is capable of sufficiently controlling or hiding human amour-propre etc., and it is noteworthy that no maxime is cited to show what powers “la raison classique” may have, only the unpublished RDXIII. He does not cite evidence to show that “cacher...cet amour-propre” is possible. It is not self-evident that the Max. show how one can “se connaître et contrôler son action” especially without Lafond explaning how these words are understood, and so the citation of relevant maximes is essential for the argument that the two works have the same view of amour-propre, etc. to be persuasive. In continuing his rejection of this interpretation, Lafond argues (104- 108) that to interpret M.87 44 as meaning it is necessary to resort to “duperie” for the creation of the société of honnêtes hommes, is to find in Lar. too great a separation between moral values and psychological reality. This separation was common knowledge to all moralistes, he says, but he does not comment on the significant fact that moralistes like Pascal, Nicole, etc. used Dieu and religion as an explicit part of their analysis. Lafond claims M. 87 must be interpreted together with M. 81 45 since both date from the latest edition of the Max. and so are written at the same time as the RD. M.81 (105) shows that there are two “lois”: the universal law of amour-propre, from which we can never free ourselves, and the law which allows us to “préférer” our “amis” to ourselves, which must be respected by all who want an authentic amitié. There are then two movements, one of “pessimisme critique” and one of “affirmation positive d’un devoir à remplir” and thus (106) there is a “lucidité critique” which can help to establish “le commerce des 44 “Les hommes ne vivraient pas longtemps en société s’ils n’étaient les dupes les uns des autres.” 45 “Nous ne pouvons rien aimer que par rapport à nous, et nous ne faisons que suivre notre goût et notre plaisir quand nous préférons nos amis à nous-mêmes; c’est néanmoins par cette préférence seule que l’amitié peut être vraie et parfaite”. John Phillips 162 honnêtes gens sur des bases plus solides que celles admises généralement par le monde”. It seems however that if the bases established are only plus solides than those generally accepted, they will ultimately not be solides enough without the explicit introduction of religious notions (Dieu, grâce, péché, etc.) which are found in the parallels Lafond often adduces to explicate Lar.’s thought, notions which were intentionally omitted by Lar. His emphasis on the importance of the role M.81 plays seems puzzling and less than plausible and seems to raise other questions. Since M.81 only appears in the last edition of the Max., readers for many years would have been reading them without the help Lafond claims is essential for the correct (religious) interpretation of the Max. His interpretation of M.81, read in the context of all the Max., seems difficult and not immediately evident. It is not clear how readers would understand that it was indicating a “devoir à remplir” (not Lar.’s words), for which duty Lafond also cites a passage in RDII (185) (“...commerce particulier que les gens doivent avoir ensemble”) 46 where “doivent” must be read strongly as indicating a duty to be fulfilled. So in a later passage (191) Lafond sees the same doctrine in St. Basile, Calvin, Bérulle, et al. which he finds in M.81, a maxime which he interprets as saying that we cannot escape amour-propre but we must arrange things so that there prevails in us an “oubli de notre propre intérêt”. But nothing like this last expression is in M.81, nor is there any reference to Dieu nor to any other religious terms, and it is possible to interpret M.81 as having, paradoxically, an opposite or different meaning; nor does Lafond explain how this oubli comes about. The Max. show many examples of people who think they have forgotten (oublier) their intérêts etc. or would like to present themselves to others and to themselves as having done so but not in this sense. Lafond (107) claims that RDII (and the RD in general) have an “éthique” which not only complements the Max.’s “vue critique” but is the same “vue” but “prolongée” and “reprise” at another level, that of the “morale pratique” which governs social relations. The important thing is always to be “vrai”, “sincére” with oneself and with others, and in society, one must always seem to be what one is and be what one seems. But it is not clear that one who thinks being “vrai” involves “cacher” the psychological forces of the Max. would be “vrai” in any understandable manner given the assumptions of the Max. The question remains how one would be able to control one’s amour-propre, one’s propre intérêt, etc. In a final related passage Lafond (110) discusses Nicole’s notion of amour-propre, which Nicole thinks can only be eliminated by an “ascèse religieuse” and so is something most people can not accomplish. Since 46 See Lafond (1977) 107, footnote 154. La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 163 amour-propre can imitate, undetected, all the actions of “charité” and so obtain the same benefits in “this” world as “charité,” he (111) sees Nicole proposing a “réhabilitation partielle” of amour-propre which would make it an “honnêtete” useful for contemporary society. Lafond says this is what Lar. has in mind when in RDII (185-186) he speaks of the need to “ménager” the amour-propre of others as well as one’s own since amour-propre cannot be eliminated. This is a “solution réaliste” which he claims Lar. has also found, but without explaining how the Max.’s conception of amour-propre ressembles that of Nicole. Nicoles’ conception is an intimate part of his very explicitly Christian view of man and the world, and it is the Christian nature of his views which allows them to have a completeness and a lack of ambiguity. It is however exactly such an explicit, comprehensive religious view which is omitted by Lar, and it is only in material he eliminated before publication that there is some explicit religious material. Several times Lafond claims that to understand Lar. one must see him operating on “deux niveaux”, one a morale banale, the search for true virtue, and the other an “honnêtete” for man in société, and that if one does not do this, one is claiming that not only Lar. but also Pascal and Nicole contradict themselves. Lar.’s thought however is so different from theirs that further arguments would be needed for this claim to be persuasive. Despite the undoubted strengths of Lafond’s overall analysis some of the ways he supports the compatibility of these two works is not persuasive. Though he is clear that Lar. is writing a mondain work and is not attempting to act as a spiritual guide, he claims Lar. has a religious intention. In support he cites explicitly religious contemporary writers without giving the necessary weight to the great differences between them and Lar. that arise from Lar.’s avoidance of religious themes and his elimination of religious material. By assimilating Lar. in this way too closely to these explicitly religious writers he creates the impression that Lar. had the same purpose in mind as they did, yet Lafond does not present convincing evidence for this. He also treats all of Lar.’s writings, from private letters to intentionally rejected or non-published material, as equivalent to the material edited and published by Lar. himself. But little or no note is taken, for example, of the changes made to the Avis au lecteur, nor to other possible reasons for eliminating the Préface, and much is made of the letter to Thomas Esprit without considering it in the context of the other material showing Lar.’s concerns about peoples’ reactions to the pirated edition; and he ascribes to it greater weight than its unpublished, private status justifies. John Phillips 164 Lafond recognises the real possibility that readers might not come to his conclusion that the Max. have a religious intention 47 . Because Lar. wants to emphasize the stark Augustinian separation between “nature” and “grâce”, “l’homme naturel” and “ce qui lui est incommensurable... Dieu...le Bien...le Vrai” he 48 says Lar. gives a too simple, too extreme picture of “la nature humaine” and of the “motivations de notre conduite”. In response to the claim that if Lar. has a religious intention it was incumbent on him as on others “qu’on le dise” (Bénichou), Lafond agrees 49 that Lar. “ne conclut pas”, that a writer of maximes does not have to give his conclusions, that drawing conclusions is up to the reader, that (1976, 24) his “intention apologétique” does not “se trahit” but is “indirecte et seconde” 50 . He thinks that the danger of misreading (not seeing the religious intention) is obviated since the reader can follow the “organisation thématique” of the entire collection 51 but his description of how one would do this seems daunting for a reader (of the seventeenth or any other century) considering all the elaborate and detailed analyses that would be required. 52 He says the public wanted a kind of “négligence” in such a work and was not favorably disposed toward “trop grande régularité” yet that same public is supposed to sort through and organise different groupings of 504 maximes 53 in five revised editions published over a dozen plus years and simultaneously to know about the suppressed material as well as being able to keep all this in suspension until key material (M.81) arrives in the 1678 edition. He acknowledges 54 that Lar. “semble avoir eu conscience de la difficulté que le lecteur moyen rencontrait” and so included M.81 and M.183 to help him out, but these are one hundred maximes apart from one another. He admits 55 that some of the crucial material forms a kind of “hors-texte” (Lar.’s correspondance, especially the letter to Thomas Esprit, the RD, his “milieu” etc.) but since this remains outside the Max. and since we do not know what else was part of this “hors-texte” or who had access to it, his acknowledgement that Lar. leaves the interpretation 47 See Mesnard “La rencontre de La Rochefoucauld avec Port-Royal” 165, who sees Lar. in this respect “entouré de mystère”. 48 Lafond (1976) Folio ed. 15-16. 49 Lafond (1976) Folio ed. 19. 50 And Lafond admits (1978, 146-147) the “discours augustinien” is incomplete in the Max. because it has no “theodicée” or “compensation”. 51 See for example Lafond (1988) 150; (1987) 186-188. 52 And see Escola “Ce désordre a ses grâces” for another consideration of more complicated possible arrangements. 53 For example one must work with M.1-M.100, plus M.504, M.101-M.249, M.250- M.316, and this with over 180 maximes omitted. 54 See Lafond (1989) 175. 55 See Lafond (1987) 190-192. La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 165 ultimately to the reader seems to undermine his claims. How would a reader know he had succesfully completed his analysis given the amount and complexity of the material, and the necessity to include things not in the text 56 ? As he says 57 Lar. has written a “texte dont le contexte est omis ou n’est pas étendu pour être suffisamment éclairant” 58 . Henry C. Clark also thinks it is possible to view the two works as having compatible views of the human psyche. He is clear 59 that there are signifi- 56 And it is noteworthy that of the contemporaries who are cited as seeing clearly Lar.’s religious intention we are not provided with their interpretation of the entire collection. 57 See Lafond (1987) 184. 58 Requemora follows Lafond in important ways. Though she is primarily concerned with the Max., she discusses the evidence for a negative view of the possibility of real amitié, ultimately deciding (707 ff.) that Lar. sees deux espèces (722) of amitié, one a vehicule for amour-propre, the other connected to a “loi morale” which allows a special kind of ami to become a héros and an honnête homme. Lar. the actual historical person is in fact this véritable ami (721-722, 728) as can be seen from his autoportrait. This is to treat the autoportrait not as a literary work but as a transparent, self-evident unambiguous document, and this approach echoes the criticism of some early readers of the Max., that the picture of humanity in the Max. was just a picture of the author writ large. In establishing this positive view of amitié she makes use of RDII (715 ff.) and of Lafond’s interpretation of it and of M.81 (Lafond (1977) 105-6. Though she sees that Lar. does not play this role in the Max., she claims that in RDII he plays the role of “mentor” for the reader (716), and provides “un code du parfait ami” who is aware of the need for “juste mesure” in friendship, which can be achieved by following M.81; but she too does not explain how, except by resorting to religion, anyone could achieve this level of control given the view of man in the Max. She agrees with Lafond that M.81 shows the way to combine the “loi de nature” (amour-propre) and the “loi morale” (respecting others enough to have an authentic friendship) which is understood as a duty which must be completed. She does not consider other possible interpretations of the difficult and ambiguous M.81, nor does she explain how, even if readers understood M.81 as she does (as a revelation of the “maturation” of Lar.’s thought) they could then fit this into the rest of the maximes on amitié which she has just analysed. She claims (723 ff.) that even given the absence of religious terms, Lar.’s ideal ami plays the role of “l’élu laic de Dieu” (723), a view she finds support for in the Avis of the second and subsequent editions, because only Dieu could give one “la grâce de corriger l’amour-propre et de permettre la vraie amitié” (723). The true ami (724) will not need to read the Max. because “il a la foi et a reçu la grâce” that allows for the overcoming of amour-propre and the attainment of true amitié. To make this more persuasive she would have to argue and prove the case that Lar. had a religious goal which included conversion and grace. 59 Clark (186) says that the “knottiest” problem in Lar. is seeing how Lar.’s “honnêtete and the self-love of the Max. are compatible”. John Phillips 166 cant problems reconciling the Max. and RDII (and the RD in general), but he thinks Lar. finds a way to do this. The Max. (194) raise very serious doubts, amply demonstrated by Clark (105 ff.), about the possibility of creating the société envisioned in RDII, a community where each knows and accomodates the interests and sentiments of others, where all are in harmony and seek their mutual benefits, where each contributes to the others’ pleasure while each “manages” his own and others’ self-preference (amour-propre), but RDII “lays down the rule” which makes this possible, namely “everyone must maintain his freedon”. Sincerity is the principle of unity in the Max. and the RD, as the honnête homme, characterised by sincerity, has a love of truth which enables him to face what is hidden, what is behind the mask. But Clark does not analyse anything in the Max. to show that sincerity allows one to control one’s passions, interests, amour-propre etc. which would be required for the establisment of this society. As he says, the Max. had often shown how self-love (amour-propre) subverts the very “moral-psychological” foundation of a société like the one in RDII, and it is not clear how the people in such a society would fare any better than the people in the Max. (196) 60 . Lar. does not abandon the view of the human psyche found in the Max., as is clear (195) from RDII (185): “...chacun veut trouver son plaisir et ses avantages aux dépens des autres; on se préfère toujours à ceux avec qui on se propose de vivre, et on leur fait presque toujours sentir cette préférence; c’est ce qui trouble et qui détruit la société”. Clark claims that the section of RDII (185-186) where it is said “Il faudrait du moins savoir cacher ce désir de préférence, puisqu’il est trop naturel en nous pour nous en pouvoir défaire; il faudrait faire son plaisir et celui des autres, ménager leur amour-propre et ne le blesser jamais” resolves the “tension” which results from Lar. not abandoning the Max. view of the human psyche, a tension (194) pervading Lar.’s work, a tension between two aristocratic moral visions of the ideal, between an individualistic and a communitarian conception, between heroic truthtelling and the more modest requirements of a community of honnêtes gens. Since M.202 shows 61 that Lar. thinks that the “faux honnêtes gens” are the 60 Clark (130-132) thinks that Lar. found a way to counter the difficulties presented by the psychology of the Max. in Lar.’s notion of “force”, the idea of a “pure will unmediated by custom or reasoning”. The “strong” will be able to fare better than others (M.477, M.404, M.237, etc.) because they will be better able to “cope with a recalcitrant world”. 61 Clark is perhaps not correct to claim that M.202 (“Les faux honnêtes gens sont ceux qui déguisent leurs défauts aux autres et à eux-mêmes. Les vrais honnêtes gens sont ceux qui les connaissent parfaitement et les confessent.”) is one of the few “maximes whose moral earnestness seems untempered by...irony or ambi- La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 167 ones who disguise their faults, etc., the société in RDII turns out to be, quite surprisingly, the “commerce” of the “faux honnêtes gens” of M.202, and it is (197) the honnête homme who is the narrator of RDII who confronts them. But Clark (196) asks why the “unmasker of the Maximes” 62 would propose a société where each member could hide his feelings and needs as succesfully as any other, when what would be needed would be an impossible selftranscendence so as to accommodate others. How could reason, so unreliable in the Max., “manage” the amour-propre of others? Lar. resolves this in two ways. First he limits himself to the less real of two things, in that he says (RDII 185) he will treat société and not amitié. Secondly Lar. chooses, as his way out of this “cul-de-sac” (196), to give himself of a “privileged Archimedian point from which to see (if not to move) everything around him”. Clark is sure (135) from the autoportrait that Lar. “holds a superior vantage point and special qualities not available” to those he observes, thereby indicating he does not share the “suffering” characteristic of the human condition as seen in the Max. The person (136- 137) of superior “force de l’âme” represents the positive ideal “of Lar.’s moral realism”. This means Clark thinks that the Max., in some unexplained way, are autobiographical, and that the autoportrait is not a literary work conforming to specific literary conventions but a self-evident transparent document to be taken at face value 63 . This raises serious questions about the purpose and value of the Max. if they are simply the observations of a “superior” one concerning his less fortunate fellows. He claims (191) that for Lar. only a select few (including the narrator of RDII and Lar. himself) are capable of seeing the truth about themselves, namely those who have their “âme bien faite” and have the “force de l’âme” (M.316) to do this. Only those with the “superior critical reason” to confront their own trurth can have the capacity to “faire l’anatomie de tous les cœurs”. This then (196) allows for “il y a de la politesse et de l’humanité” which assures that the guity” which is so common in the Max. Read in the context of all the Max. it seems it is not necessarily unambiguous and without irony; a reader might well ask how one was to tell the two types apart, how the reader would determine which group anyone was in, and perhaps even what exactly confesser meant and whether it was even possible. 62 Clark (11, 170) looks at Lar. as a writer who wants to “debunk” what is usually thought or claimed about moral life, which Clark calls “unmasking”. 63 Certain statements in the autoportrait would seem in need of clarification if his reading of it is correct. For example (Tr. 255) Lar.’s apparent nonchalance about his writing seems belied by the efforts put into the unpublished Apologie as well as into the yet-to-be-published Max. So too his claim to not yet have ever loved may well have suprised many of his contemporaries (though not Mme de Sévigné) who knew of his relationship with Mme de Longueville. John Phillips 168 narrator of RDII “ne pas entrer trop avant dans les replis du coeur” (RDII 188). And it is this narrator (who, according to Clark, is Lar.’s honnête homme as well as Lar.) who exercises this restraint in his conversations with the “faux honnêtes gens”. Though he acknowledges there are substantial diffulties reconciling the two works, he does not give a detailed comparison of the views of the human psyche seen in the two works to show how it is possible to control or manage the destructive elements in this psyche sufficiently to create the conditions required for the société of RDII. It is not clear that the “unmasking” provided for in the Max. in and of itself changes a person’s relationship to his own psyche 64 . Even if the “unmasking” makes clear that “nos vertus ne sont, le plus souvent, que des vices déguisés” the Max. do not indicate that all problems are thus solved. Just facing the truth is not the same as controlling the forces in one’s psyche. Nor is it clear that the maximes 65 cited (191) support his claims for them. Even if he is correct (193) that in RDII (and other RD) Lar. assumes a “teaching posture” not found in the Max. which “urges” the reader to “extend himself by judiciously integrating the qualities of others” into his own character, he has not explained where Lar. shows that this can be done and how to do it, and how the forces in the Max. opposed to this could be controlled enough to make this possible; nor does he show how the Max. are presenting something which is “teachable” by (93) providing “models to follow” 66 . One can not assume that Lar. presents himself as the narrator of RDII or of the Max.; to do so would make these works autobiographical in an unhelpful way. It makes one wonder why Lar. wrote the Max. as he has if ultimately his point was that some people “have it” and some do not. Clark’s interpretation allows readers to take a position resembling that taken by one of Lar.’s readers 67 in the correspondance with Mme de Sablé, who says, in effect, that the unknown author (i.e. Lar.) depicts “bad” people, the letter writer implies she is not among those who are “bad” because she is “good”, therefore the Max. do not apply to her 68 . Clark seriously weakens the Max. in order to save the continuity he says they have with RDII. Once he exempts the narrator of RDII and of the Max. and Lar. himself from the intractable difficulties of the human psyche he overturns the significance 64 See also Chariatte, who in several places claims this is true, for example 117f. 65 M.316, 62, 116, 184, 383. 66 Requemora is of this opinion but a number of critics think Lar. was not suggesting a “solution”, for example Campion (66, 67), Brunn (2009) (63), Parmentier (62, 68, 70, 71, 74-75, 77, 79). 67 Tr. 570, lettre 32. 68 A similar situation is mentioned by La Chapelle-Bessé (Tr. 274, 279-280). La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 169 and the point of the Max. These intractable difficulties presumably must apply to all humans, as all humans are self-deceived, etc. though not necessarily in all areas at all times and to the same degree, but often enough to avoid awkward truths such as those encountered in the Max. If some can decide they are exempt then the Max. would appear to be invalid starting from the epigraph (“nos vertus...”) and they would become another example of a common type of book, one where a morally superior individual lectures other less superior individuals, a claim about Lar.’s purpose which would require proof. Paul Bénichou’s 69 purpose is not to show that RDII has the same view of the human psyche as the Max., but he does make significant use of RDII and argues that it and the Max. can be combined to show Lar.’s understanding of the human condition. He claims (12, 15, 17-19) that there is a problem in regard to the apparent contradictions in Lar.’s works between (5-7, 9) the system of amour-propre in MS.1, and the idea of a capricious and indifferent natural causation governing man. This is resolved when one considers the source of these contradictions, namely (19) Lar. the man: “Voilà bien le caractère dont sont sorties les Maximes! ” This character is most clearly seen in Lar.’s autoportrait, with its emphasis on melancholy, and in the portrait of him by Retz. Lar., the man and the writer (23), opposes to everyday man and his “virtues” an ideal type which, though rarely seen, forms part of Lar.’s belief that virtue does exist. Whereas the Max. do not present a religious counterpart to their pessimistic views of the human psyche and the human condition, they do contain (29) positive reflections leading to an “art de vivre profane”. Lar.’s honnête homme (30) is not condemned to “malheur”, for the human condition is between “malheur” and “bonheur”; the (31) “honnête homme” (though there is irony in this) is the one who can live with the “fausseté” that is life while simultaneously recognising it as fausseté because it is the “mensonge” that unites people in an “équilibre des amourspropres”, the surest foundation for a life in common. Amour-propre (32) can and must be controlled, toned down, as each person must, in the eyes of others, lessen the severity of what all really know, namely (RDII 185-186) “Il serait inutile de dire combien la société est nécessaire aux hommes: tous la désirent et tous la cherchent, mais peu se servent des moyens de la rendre agréable et de la faire durer. Chacun veut trouver son plaisir et ses avantages aux dépens des autres; on se préfère toujours à ceux avec qui on se propose de vivre, et on leur fait presque toujours sentir cette préférence; c’est ce qui trouble et qui détruit la société. Il faudrait du moins savoir cacher ce désir de préférence, puisqu’il est trop naturel en nous pour nous en pouvoir défaire; il faudrait faire 69 Bénichou, “L’Intention...”. John Phillips 170 son plaisir et celui des autres, ménager leur amour-propre, et ne le blesser jamais”. Lar. is not proposing a repudiation of the “mensonge” of this world for the “vérité” of another, but he wants to accept the “comédie humaine” reduced to “proportions honnêtes”. He (32, 33) is not suggesting a “doctrine de salut” but “une civilisation”. He thinks Lar. provides for the possiblity for an “amour-propre policié” which is separate from the “amour-propre brutal”. Lar. is not sure that this can be attained but he proposes it knowing and fearing that there will be those who misunderstand his “prédication profane”. Bénichou opposes to the view that the Max. is essentially a negative, pessimistic work the view that it is both negative and positive. Though he primarily discusses the Max., he quotes (32) all of the second paragraph of RDII (185-186 quoted above) to summarise what he sees as Lar.’s version (in the RD) of the difficulties inherent in the Max.’s view of the human pysche (“Il serait...détruit la société”) as well as what he sees as the RD version of Lar.’s solution for these problems (“Il faudrait...jamais” (RDII 186). He does not, however, analyse any maximes in order to show how the equilibrium and control of the human pysche and its amour-propre as described in RDII could be brought about, he simply states that Lar. is indicating it is possible. He says that Lar. presents a picture of the human condition, of “l’homme déchu”, which was not at all uncommon in the moralistes of the time (15-16), but for which Lar. was not offering a religious solution, and he thinks he finds in Lar.’s work a positive view to counterbalance the negative elements of the Max.’s world view. Bénichou’s description of the powerful forces revealed in the Max. resembles the commonly accepted one, but if his description is correct, his ideas about what he claims Lar. in RDII is proposing to counterbalance this view seem inadequate for the very difficulties he describes. No evidence is cited from the Max. to show how one could separate the “amour-propre brutal” from the “amour-propre policié” (nor to show that Lar. thought these actually exist) nor how one could reach this “équilibre des amours-propres” and so arrive at this “comédie humaine” reduced to “proportions honnêtes”. The idea that the contradictions in Lar.’s ideas are due to the character of the man Lar. as seen in his autoportrait and in Retz’ portrait seems dubious and not at all helpful. What is missing is a detailed examination of the positives in RDII which are said to counterbalance the negatives of the Max. and a demonstration of what they counterbalance and how. Jean Starobinski (1966 I, II) does not specifically say the psychological assumptions of the Max. are compatible with those of RDII and the other RD, but he claims (I, 16-34) the Max. have conclusively exposed the “néant”, the “vide intérieur” (19, 33) at the heart of man and of human endeavours, the damage wrought by the powerful negative forces in the La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 171 human psyche. Nonetheless he claims that this is ultimately irrelevant to the world he says (II) Lar. builds above or beyond the world of the Max. Since human action and knowledge are impossible or corrupted (II 211) we are only left with “désespoir”, but this leads us to a “transmutation esthétique” where we give up moral obligations for “des tâches esthétiques” and “valeurs esthétiques” which will themselves become “impératifs” once they will have been substituted for the “impératifs moraux”. Since Lar.’s demonstration of man’s “néant” (II 212) has shown that the “vie mondaine” can only have an arbitrary, gratuitous form without any relation to man’s “désespoir”, we will build a “monde de la vanité” with “paroles vaines”, but a vain world that will be recognised and accepted as such. The “conviction pessimiste” (the Max.) will not be changed but covered with a “glacis d’hédonisme”. Because of the brute recalcitrance of the natural world of fortune and humors, we can substitute, for (II 213) the “éthique de l’action”, an “esthétique de l’expression” which will allow us to develop an “honnêteté” which is a “perfection accessible” because man will be (II 213) the “inventeur de ses valeurs”; hence we will no longer strive for something beyond our “portée”. Our (II 213) “seul privilège” is “la parole”, and though man in his actions and passions is dominated by the blind forces of nature etc., he is (II 214) the “maître de sa parole” (provided he does not try to use it for “domination” or for reaching “la vérité des êtres et des choses”) and this power allows him to create a “monde artificiel” governed by the conventions of language. Without abolishing the “forces inhumaines” (the Max.) which control us, man will have a place (II 214) where “l’homme y sera chez lui”. This is (II 215) the only basis on which man can build “la société polie”, where he can (II 216) search for “l’agréable” in a world where the supreme success is “plaire”. It wil be in conversation that each will find a “nouvelle existence” (II 218), a “seconde maniere d’être” without abolishing the “être premier” (as seen in the Max., with its “néant”). But in this common search (II 226) certain limits will have to be observed so that all may live “sans risque” (RDII 187): “Il faut être facile à excuser nos amis quand leurs défauts sont nés avec eux, et qu’ils sont moindres que leurs bonnes qualités; il faut souvent éviter de leur faire voir qu’on les ait remarqués et en soit choqué”. And for “la douceur de la société” each must pretend to not know what has been learned in “les profondeurs ignobles” inside each person (RDII 188): “On peut leur parler des choses qui les regardent, mais ce n’est qu’autant qu’ils le permettent, et on y doit garder beaucoup de mesure; il y a de la politesse, et quelquefois même de l’humanité, à ne pas entrer trop avant dans les replis de leur cœur; ils ont souvent de la peine à laisser voir tout ce qu’ils en connaissent, et ils en ont encore davantage quand on pénètre ce qu’ils ne connaissent pas. Bien que le commerce John Phillips 172 que les honnêtes gens ont ensemble leur donne de la familiarité, et leur fournisse un nombre infini de sujets de se parler sincèrement, personne presque n’a assez de docilité et de bon sens pour bien recevoir plusieurs avis qui sont nécessaires pour maintenir la société; on veut être averti jusqu’à un certain point, mais on ne veut pas l’être en toutes choses, et on craint de savoir toutes sortes de vérités”. In fact (II 226-227) it is best to “dissimuler notre amour-propre” (RDII 185-186): “Il faudrait... savoir cacher ce désir de préférence, puisqu’il est trop naturel en nous, pour nous en pouvoir défaire”. As “complices” we will all know how to keep secrets which could “ternir nos plaisirs”. For the present purpose, it is difficult to address Starobinski’s comments, since he seems for the most part to have chosen not to provide a detailed reading of Lar.’s text. He often provides no textual evidence from Lar. but seems to assume that Lar. has a philosophical or moral system with lacunae which must be filled in (though he says (I 22) any system is impossible). He claims that Lar. was implicitly proposing another world on top of and including the real world (the Max.) and he expects this new world will not abolish the negative truths found in the real world (the Max.) but will create something entirely different. However without supporting textual evidence that this was Lar.’s object, implied or not, this is hard to find persuasive. The claims Starobinski makes for speech do not seem plausible or possible from the point of view of the Max. And speech seems to be a human biological inheritance, and is, as far as we know, unique to humans, is something individuals learn before they are fully rational. Therefore it is difficult to see how Starobinski can claim that somehow human speech is not a part of human life, is not beset by the same psychological (and other) difficulties by which all human activities are beset, the difficulties depicted in the Max. He does not explain how human speech could escape human nature and so not be troubled by the same forces that trouble human nature. Human language is spoken by people in bodies which die. To say, as he does, that as “maître de la parole” men, provided they do not use conversation for “domination” or for seeking “vérités”, will have this new power, seems to deprive the Max. of revelance. If the human desire for “domination” is so easily put aside, why write the Max.? If all men really want to do is “communiquer humainement” how could they do this “humainement” and not reproduce the difficulties seen in the Max.? And here especially one would want to see arguments with supporting textual evidence that Lar. held out such possibilities for human speech. One difficulty raised in claiming that language allows for the creation of a place where “l’homme y sera chez lui” is that Lar. would probably think that he has already written a work that shows where man is “chez lui”, namely, the Max. And if man becomes the La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and Reflexion diverse II “De la société” 173 “inventeur des ses valeurs” how could these not be the product of the same forces experienced by man in the everyday world? How is man not already the “inventeur des ses valeurs”? It seems Starobinski claims Lar. simply invented another world where the problems of this world would have somehow been solved. And the same problem arises here which arises in the critics discussed above, namely the need to analyse and show how the specific psychological forces described in the Max. could be controlled enough for any of what is suggested to take place. 70 The critics considered here have made useful observations on Lar.’s work but they do not seem to have justified, by a close examination of the texts, claims that the Max. and RDII have compatible views of the human psyche. Though they are by no means all arguing in the same way there are 70 Thweatt also claims that the Max. and the RD including RDII share essential psychological assumptions. The difference between the two works is the difference in the perspective from which Lar. looks on the human condition. He sees much corruption in the human psyche as portrayed in the Max. Amour-propre or orgueil (159) is the basic flaw and root cause of human vices. Throughout the Max. this is the motive passion of the self. In fact the Max. show us (162) “a wasteland of virtue and value,” a “tableau vivant of the children of pride”; we all have the “aberrational folly of human understanding and behavior” and suffer the “tyranny of weakness”. We are usually (170) “at the mercy of fortune”. That the mind (173) is the “dupe du cœur” means that “corporality corrupts the self”. In fact (174) the “force of nature is greater than the force of will”, as “the will is incapable of following reason” and reason is corrupted by the force of passion. The Max. (176) continually show “the failure of reason and will to harness or bend the inclinations of the wayward heart”. In sum he sees the Max. as having a very dim view of the possibilty of human control of man’s psychic impulses, needs, amour-propre, etc. However (135) he sees Lar. as having undergone a change of “optic”; he went from a “single optic” in the Max. to “bipolarity” in the RD. There is a change in emphasis and proportion (135) since in the Max. Lar. viewed the “social comedy” from “an Olympian distance” but in the RD Lar. “walks among the personalities and heroes of his world”. Despite this, Lar. (137) accepts in the RD the earlier description of amour-propre. This is because Lar. accepts the amour-propre of RDII as a given factor of the “unregenerate self” because it is “trop naturel…défaire” (RDII 185-186) but that in the RD Lar. condemns “the prestidigitation of style and the patina of paraître”. Lar. is indicating (139) a possible compromise between “chacun...pour...jamais (RDII 185-186)” and “Pour rendre...libre (RDII 186-187)”. However difficult it is to achieve this balance Lar. sees it as possible by maintaing a “sustained sensitivity” to the separation of “the hypocrisy of social politesse” and the “demands of honnêteté” as well as to the difference between “the hidden drive for self-affirmation” and “genuine social consideration”. Since Thweatt chooses to consider these questions at a rather abstract level there are no specific questions about compatibilty posed, no detailed analysis of works leading to an answer. John Phillips 174 shared elements that are less convincing than they claim. Some 71 critics make use of non-published material as well as material Lar. rejected without an adequate explanation of the significance of his rejections and nonpublication and without providing a rationale for overriding Lar.’s rejections and non-publication. His works are not infrequently treated not as sophisticated and subtle literary works but as being autobiographical in some literarily naive way. Explictly religious writers, who show undoubted parallels in terms of ideas and of the influence of Augustinianism, are cited as proof of what critics claim Lar. meant but without an adequate explanation of the significance of Lar.’s choosing not to include comparable explicit religious material. 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