eJournals Papers on French Seventeenth Century Literature 42/83

Papers on French Seventeenth Century Literature
0343-0758
2941-086X
Narr Verlag Tübingen
2015
4283

«Il craint... un bon général»: Royal Fear and the End Result of Absolutism in Corneille’s Suréna

2015
David K. Wagner
PFSCL XLII, 83 (2015) “Il craint… un bon général” : Royal Fear and the End Result of Absolutism in Corneille’s Suréna D AVID K. W AGNER In Lettres persanes, written between 1717 and 1720, Montesquieu’s character Usbek analyzes the French court of 1713. Concerning old king Louis XIV, Usbek observes, “il aime les trophées et les victoires, mais il craint autant de voir un bon général à la tête de ses troupes, qu’il aurait sujet de le craindre à la tête d’une armée entière” (124). Usbek’s analysis raises some unsettling questions. Why would Louis XIV fear his own victorious generals? By what process could such a fear begin to color the outlook of a powerful ruler? What might happen when an absolute monarch allows his fear to determine his political strategies? Pierre Corneille explores these very questions in his last play, Suréna, written in 1674. In this play, King Orode of Parthia fears the newfound glory and influence of his successful general Suréna, who has just defeated the Romans. Because of his fear, Orode tries to manipulate the general into marrying his own daughter instead of pursuing his love for Eurydice, an Armenian princess. When this effort fails, Orode has Suréna assassinated, weakening the loyalty of his subjects and making his kingdom vulnerable to external attack. Throughout the play, Orode’s fear progressively undermines his ability to rule effectively. Further, Orode’s governing strategies, which bear strong resemblances to Louis XIV’s brand of absolutism, exacerbate the effects of his fear. In consequence, I will suggest that Corneille’s final play can be read as a warning to Louis XIV concerning the slippery process through which royal fear might potentially undercut his power as an absolute king. Any analysis of royal fear in Suréna should begin with a glimpse into the relationships between fear and politics as understood in seventeenthcentury France. Erec Koch, in The Aesthetic Body, analyzes the theories of Hobbes and Nicole, in which fear prompts the formation of any political state, preserves it through the threat of punishment for crimes, and accompanies the ever-present risk of civic unrest or rebellion (Koch 239, 265). It should be no surprise, then, if a ruler and his subjects have a certain amount of abiding fear in any political system. The passion treatises also address the relationship between politics and fear. Jean-François Senault, in David K. Wagner 276 De l’usage des passions (1641), distinguishes between positive and negative uses of “crainte.” He argues that fear can either exacerbate political problems or inform political prudence and foresight (270-282). He also suggests that a wise king should be able to control the fears of his subjects (8). In contrast, Marin Cureau de la Chambre, in Les Caractères des passions (V, 1662), argues that fear is almost always a negative political force. He explains that “la crainte… ne voyait les maux qu’avec ces lunettes qui grossissent et qui multiplient les objets… [et] se précipite à la fin en de plus grands dangers que ceux qu’elle veut éviter” (179). He warns that ruling by fear turns a king’s subjects into his foes (180). He also outlines a sequence of stages in which fear naturally progresses towards disaster (182-186). Directly critiquing Senault, he argues that fear never fosters wise decisions in any political context (175-180). While both Senault and Cureau de la Chambre suggest that fear could compromise a ruler’s judgment, Cureau de la Chambre especially emphasizes the catastrophic effects of fear. Corneille’s Suréna appears at a time when absolutism dominates political discourse in France. Louis XIV himself justifies his triumphant new regime in his Mémoires, written privately for his son, which outline his own distinctive approach to absolutist authority. Two of the most important concepts which he presents are the importance of governing completely alone and the necessity of preeminent royal glory. The king outlines several reasons for sharing no power with subordinates: Nul ne partage votre travail, sans avoir un peu de part à votre puissance. N’en laissez à autrui que ce qu’il vous sera impossible de retenir : car quelque soin que vous puissiez prendre, il vous échappera toujours beaucoup plus qu’il ne serait à souhaiter. (141-142) For Louis XIV, any sharing of political power threatens a king’s authority. He believes that any minister will take more responsibility than the king originally delegates. Consequently, he recommends that a king make all important decisions independently. A similar motive justifies his attitude towards royal glory: …la réputation ne se peut conserver sans en acquérir tous les jours davantage ; que la gloire enfin n’est pas une maitresse qu’on puisse jamais négliger, ni être digne de ses premières faveurs, si l’on n’en souhaite incessamment de nouvelles. (73) Louis XIV insists that a king must augment his glory continually and devote much care to his public image. In examining these admonitions to his son, it appears that in Louis XIV’s absolutist state, a king has two abiding fears: the loss of total authority and the loss of preeminent glory. Circumstances could arise that might threaten an absolutist king’s authority, particularly during a Royal Fear and the End Result of Absolutism in Corneille’s Suréna 277 long reign. For instance, a heroic general could pose a threat to Louis XIV’s preeminent glory. I will argue, in my analysis of Suréna, that these very principles of Louis XIV’s political philosophy facilitate the process by which Orode’s fear comes to dominate his political decisions. As I turn to Suréna, it is important to note that even before Orode appears on the stage, Eurydice, the Armenian princess, suggests that fear dominates Parthian society. In the very first scene of the play, Eurydice explains her deep misgivings concerning a potential marriage between Suréna and Orode’s daughter. This marriage vexes the young princess, because she loves the general herself. She explains: Quand on a commencé de se voir malheureuse, Rien ne s’offre à nos yeux qui ne fasse trembler, La plus fausse apparence a droit de nous troubler, Et tout ce qu’on prévoit, tout ce qu’on s’imagine, Forme un nouveau poison pour une âme chagrine. (l. 110-114) These lines describe a progression of feelings similar to Cureau de la Chambre’s diagnosis of the stages of “crainte.” Eurydice mentions trembling, false alarms, and poisonous thoughts, all normal phases in the progression of fear. Her precise words, especially “fausse” and “poison,” underscore the dangerous and misleading nature of the feelings she is experiencing. She accentuates the potential disparity between these feelings and the political reality with the verbs “prévoit” and “s’imagine” (l. 113). The feelings which she describes prevent an individual from accurately understanding their surroundings, even as they trick and poison the soul. This passage foreshadows the importance of fear throughout the play; the process Eurydice here describes could in fact describe the fear of the king himself as it clouds his perception of reality and poisons his judgment. Eurydice’s comments, at the very beginning of the play, create a veritable backdrop of fear to support Orode’s first appearance on stage in the third act of the play. Before examining the insidious emergence of Orode’s fear, it is important to note that Orode is clearly striving to be an absolute monarch in the style of Louis XIV, both by governing alone and by maintaining preeminent glory. Pierre Zoberman observes that Suréna presents a monarchy in which “le roi assume seul ses décisions” (148). He suggests that the limited role of Sillace, Orode’s counselor who only appears in one scene, and the total lack of interaction between the king and his son both indicate “la monarchie absolue de type louisquatorzien” (148). I would add that each time Orode appears on stage, he meets with only one individual. The king never consults a group of advisors and never invites an assistant to meetings with key subjects. As Ellen McClure suggests, Orode’s solitary governing contri- David K. Wagner 278 butes to the breakdown of diplomacy and makes the king vulnerable, since he fails to receive a broad range of views from his subjects to inform his decisions (240-249). While Louis XIV argues that independent decisionmaking strengthens a monarch, in this case Orode’s autonomy leads to dangerous isolation from his own kingdom. Even as Orode remains committed to governing alone, he must recognize that he is no longer supremely glorious in Parthia. In a two-prong war, Orode has led the battle against the Armenians while Suréna fought the Romans (l. 745-751). He had thought that Suréna would be unable to win on his own: …[Suréna] craindrait pour sa chute, Et me réserverait la gloire d’achever, Ou de le voir tombant, et de le relever. (l. 758-760) To put it simply, Orode miscalculated. Rather than building his glory by conquering the Romans himself, Orode suddenly must acknowledge a victorious general with the glory of a total victory (l. 766). Further aggravating the situation, Suréna’s new glory is publicly recognized: Par gloire, ou pour braver au besoin mon courroux, Vous trainez en tous lieux dix mille âmes à vous, Le nombre est peu commun pour un train domestique, (l. 895-897) Suréna’s glory is not just a private defeat for the king: everyone in Parthia knows that Suréna is a hero as he parades around with 10,000 followers. In this situation, Orode must act in order to preserve his absolutist ideal. Even after Suréna’s victory over Rome, Orode wants to be the most glorious figure in Parthia: Qu’un monarque est heureux, quand, parmi ses sujets, Ses yeux n’ont point à voir de plus nobles objets, Qu’au-dessus de sa gloire il n’y connaît personne, Et qu’il est le plus digne enfin de sa couronne. (l. 723-726) The king believes that no one in his kingdom should rival his “gloire.” Orode, like Louis XIV in his Mémoires, desires preeminent glory. At the moment, Suréna is instead a nationally recognized political hero, having brilliantly defeated the Romans. Mitchell Greenberg observes that the words “personne” and “couronne” in this passage suggest a “division” between the “Monarch” and “his transhistorical essence” (157). In other words, Orode’s personal standing in Parthia no longer, in his own mind, matches the ideal dignity of his crown. The rhyme of “personne” and “couronne” accentuates the conflict between Suréna’s existence as a newly-recognized hero and Orode’s aspirations to paramount royal glory. Royal Fear and the End Result of Absolutism in Corneille’s Suréna 279 As the public face of his absolute authority crumbles, Orode’s fear dominates his understanding of the political situation of his kingdom. He explains to Sillace that Suréna’s great victory troubles him deeply: J’en frémis, j’en rougis, je m’en indigne, et crains Qu’il n’ose quelque jour s’en payer par ses mains, Et dans tout ce qu’il a de nom et de fortune, Sa fortune me pèse, et son nom m’importune. (l. 719-722) Orode catalogues his current situation with well-known physical symptoms of fear. Shaking suggests fear, while blushing suggests shame, a related passion (l. 719). Orode’s shame underscores the rupture between his abstract vision of his own authority and his less-glorious actual circumstances. In this passage, Orode also repeats both the word “nom” and the word “fortune,” underscoring the profound way in which Suréna’s personal reputation troubles him (l. 721-722). Both the general’s name and his success contribute directly to Suréna’s public honor and glory, threatening Orode’s absolutist supremacy. The rhyme of “crains” and “mains” accentuates the direct connection between Suréna’s physical power and agency and Orode’s fear and passivity. It is Suréna’s hands which cause Orode’s fear, somehow rendering the king a mere victim of circumstances. The king fears a moment when Suréna could take political control for himself with his own strength. Orode’s fear seems to rob him of any sense of agency over the political destiny of Parthia, even though he is still the king. Instead of enjoying an important political victory for his kingdom, Orode dwells on this new potential threat from within: Ainsi d’une si haute et si prompte victoire, J’emporte tout le fruit et lui toute la gloire, Et beaucoup plus heureux que je n’aurais voulu, Je me fais un malheur d’être trop absolu. Je tiens toute l’Asie, et l’Europe en alarmes, Sans que rien s’en impute à l’effort de mes armes, Et quand tous mes voisins tremblent pour leurs États, Je ne les fais trembler que par un autre bras. J’en tremble enfin moi-même… (l. 765-773) The word “tremble,” which appears three times in this passage, is an important physical symptom of fear (l. 771-773). Trembling within the king’s physical body could foreshadow upheaval within the king’s other figurative body, the state. From the exterior, Orode appears a powerful ruler. Yet, paradoxically, the victorious king fears just as if he were defeated. Helen Bates McDermott argues that in this passage Orode considers “the gift of power” as his problem and labels him an “indifferent king” (207). However, David K. Wagner 280 I would assert that Orode clings to his ideal of absolute authority. He laments that his general has the “gloire” of the victory, seemingly forgetting that as king he gets to enjoy the “fruit” of the success (l. 766). Rather than being “heureux” in Parthia’s victory, the king only perceives the “malheur” of his own lack of personal political glory (l. 767-768). The rhyme of “absolu” and “voulu” accentuates the conflict between Suréna’s victory and the king’s original plan for the military campaign (l. 767-768). In general, Orode seems unconcerned with the Parthian state as a whole, focusing on himself rather than his kingdom as he uses the pronoun “je” seven times in eight lines. The words “me,” “mes,” and “moi-même” further accentuate the king’s self-absorption (l. 768, 770, 771, 773). Orode’s fear blinds him to the broad advantages of the new international standing of his own kingdom. As Orode’s fear clouds his political outlook, the king repeatedly references his fear during meetings with his subjects. For instance, when Suréna comes to talk with him, Orode’s fear repeatedly seeps into his discourse, undermining his own authority and hampering the effectiveness of his negotiations. Right from the beginning of the discussion, the king openly hints at his fear: “Il n’est rien d’impossible à la valeur d’un homme / Qui rétablit son maître, et triomphe de Rome” (l. 849-850). Suréna responds to this unnecessary admission with a promise to serve the king (l. 877-878). Brushing aside Suréna’s pledge of loyalty, Orode encourages the general to marry his daughter, describing the potential marriage as a reward for the general’s valor. Suréna politely declines the offer, because of his love for Eurydice. Even as he admits his weaknesses to his general, the king ignores Suréna’s pledges of loyalty and disregards his romantic preferences. Weakening his own argument, the king then admits that this marriage is necessary to reinforce his own power: “Je ne vous saurais croire assez en mon pouvoir, / Si les nœuds de l’hymen n’enchaînent le devoir” (l. 899- 900). The king’s avowal of his fear to Suréna weakens the persuasiveness of his proposal. Since Suréna explicitly knows that Orode is acting out of fear, he is less likely to take the king seriously. Further, the king suggests an entirely internal process, in which he must mentally satisfy himself that Suréna is not a threat. As Suréna hesitates, Orode warns him, “Si le Ciel par vos mains m’a rendu cet empire, / Je sais vous épargner la peine de le dire” (l. 909-910). The king again connects Suréna’s hands to his royal authority over his kingdom, even as he threatens to wield his power to silence the general. Throughout the entirety of his meeting with Suréna, Orode fails to control his language to conceal his fearfulness, undercutting his negotiating power. As Orode desperately tries to arrange a marriage between Suréna and his daughter, he shows less and less respect for his subjects. As Hélène Royal Fear and the End Result of Absolutism in Corneille’s Suréna 281 Merlin-Kajman observes, Orode’s attitude contributes to widespread and growing confusion on the proper separation between the public and private spheres over the course of the play (536). Orode scathingly rebukes Suréna for expressing his marital preferences to the king: Est-ce au peuple, est-ce à vous, Suréna, de me dire, Pour lui donner des rois, quel sang je dois élire ? Et pour voir dans l’État tous mes ordres suivis, Est-ce de mes sujets que je dois prendre avis ? (l. 937-940) Orode criticizes Suréna for trying to have an open dialogue with his king. The king does not think that a major figure in his kingdom should discuss a public matter in a private conversation with him. He indicates that he has no interest in the general’s opinions concerning royal marriages. I would consider this reaction an unwise reordering of the separation between the public and the private spheres which prevents the king from getting useful information from an important subject. In addition, as Merlin-Kajman observes, Orode’s rhetoric in line 937 reinforces a connection between the general and the people (537). Suréna, perhaps unwittingly, has come to represent the people in the king’s mind. As such, Suréna’s disobedience becomes equivalent to a full-scale rebellion in Parthia. For Orode, obedience to his orders is more important than knowing the attitudes of his people. Because of Orode’s fear, he is unable to rationally consider various perspectives concerning state policy and weigh the advantages of each option. Instead, he construes any resistance to his plans, especially on the part of Suréna, as additional justification of his overpowering fear of the general. During his meeting with Orode, Suréna proposes one original alternative to a marriage to the king’s daughter. The general suggests that he could go on a mission of world conquest to find a worthy husband for the princess to marry (l. 872-873). Bates McDermott interprets this suggestion as a threat to Orode’s power and a sign of aggression (208). However, I find it surprising that Orode does not seize upon this excellent opportunity to rid himself of his general. The king could send Suréna to attack Rome, preoccupying Parthia’s greatest enemy. While Suréna was far removed from Parthia, the people would likely begin to forget their new hero. In addition, Suréna might even lose his life during an additional military campaign. Further, if Orode’s daughter indeed were to marry a foreign prince, Parthia’s international political standing would likely be further strengthened. Despite all the advantages to Suréna’s suggestion, Orode does not indicate any interest in the idea. Rather than understanding Suréna’s offer as another token of his patriotic goodwill, the king abruptly replies, “Je n’examine point si ce respect déguise” (l. 881). Orode seems to construe Suréna’s offer as a ruse or an additional threat to his authority. I would argue that Orode’s David K. Wagner 282 overpowering fear prevents him from discerning the benefits of Suréna’s offer to engage in a new campaign. Yet again, Orode’s fear impedes the productivity of his meeting with his best general. After meeting with Suréna, Orode further reveals his fear in a conversation with the general’s sister Palmis. Once more, the king shows little concern for the normal separation between the public and the private spheres. Orode first asks Palmis to share all the secrets she knows about Eurydice. Startled, Palmis replies, “Seigneur, m’est-il permis d’en faire confiance ? / Reçoit-on des secrets sans une forte loi ? ” (l. 978-979). The king tells Palmis that rules of confidentiality can be ignored for a monarch (l. 980). Orode eliminates the boundary of the private zone in order to know everything about Eurydice’s love, showing disdain for Palmis’ conscience. To avoid talking about Eurydice, Palmis shares her own romantic feelings for the king’s own son (l. 999-1020). Even though these details concern his son, Orode shows no interest. Instead, he excoriates Palmis for mentioning her private passions: C’est bien traiter les rois en personnes communes Qu’attacher à leur rang ces gênes importunes, Comme si pour vous plaire, et les inquiéter, Dans le trône avec eux l’amour pouvait monter. …Du reste, en ces grands nœuds l’État qui s’intéresse Ferme l’œil aux attraits, et l’âme à la tendresse. La seule politique est ce qui nous émeut, On la suit, et l’amour s’y mêle comme il peut. (l. 1025-1028, 1033-1036) In effect, Orode draws a zigzag line to separate the public and the private. This time, he enlarges the private zone and separates himself from it. Orode only takes interest in private matters if they directly relate to his fear of Suréna. Otherwise, he perceives passionate subjects as an additional threat to his authority, suggesting that Palmis, with her openness, disrespectfully treats the king like an ordinary person (l. 1025). Orode’s fear so contaminates his public discourse that Palmis’ open description of her own love becomes an attack on his royal power. As a result, Orode proposes a version of kingship in which the monarch feels no compassion and cannot understand the love of his subjects. Unfortunately, this model distances the king from his people, making him less capable of anticipating their romantic preferences and predicting their actions. Moreover, Orode claims to act exclusively by “la seule politique.” As Merlin-Kajman observes, “la politique” always has a negative meaning in Corneille’s plays, often in connection with Machiavellian strategies, focusing on a ruler’s own interest rather than the public good (522-523). In this case, Orode’s fear compels him to Royal Fear and the End Result of Absolutism in Corneille’s Suréna 283 focus on limited personal ends. Orode chooses “la politique” rather than compassionately respecting his subjects’ preferences to build their loyalty and earn their trust. Signficantly, Orode’s meetings with both Suréna and Palmis are fruitless; both times, the king’s fear undermines his attempts to gain useful information. Even before Orode tries to arrange a marriage between Suréna and his daughter, he considers the alternative of an assassination in his discussion with Sillace. Merlin-Kajman suggests that Suréna represents the end of “la politique comme ressource, solution de compromis,” suggesting that standard political measures lose their effectiveness over the course of the play (537). Importantly, it is Sillace who first suggests assassinating Suréna, noting that “la saine politique” allows only a marriage or assassination as means to control the general (l. 727-730). His recommendation is based on “la politique,” in the Cornelian sense, and also represents a limited understanding of the range of political options available. Rather than envisioning other, less drastic alternatives, Orode seems to fully accept Sillace’s assessment that only two viable solutions exist: Ma pensée est la vôtre, Mais s’il ne veut pas l’un, pourrai-je vouloir l’autre ? Pour prix de ses hauts faits, et de m’avoir fait roi, Son trépas…ce mot seul me fait pâlir d’effroi, Ne m’en parle jamais : que tout l’État périsse, Avant que jusque-là ma vertu se ternisse, Avant que je défère à ces raisons d’État, Qui nommeraient justice un si lâche attentat ! (l. 737-744) Right from the beginning, Orode agrees completely with Sillace (l. 737). The king does not seem to have any original thoughts on the situation, simply copying his counselor’s opinion without proposing any other options. His blind acceptance of Sillace’s appraisal of the situation underscores the crippling nature of his fear. Further, Orode does not recognize any flaws in Sillace’s logic. As Michel Pringent notes, Orode does not consider how this marriage might alleviate his fear of Suréna, just as he fails to consider the long-term effects of an assassination (507). However, Orode wonders if he could truly desire to kill his own general (l. 738). He weighs Suréna’s successes in preserving Parthia against his potential “trépas” (l. 739-740). After “trépas,” there is an ellipsis, a pause or suspension indicating a rupture in which the king contemplates his own dilemma. It is as if the king cannot find a satisfactory word to follow “trépas.” Initially, the ellipsis seems to separate acceptance of Sillace’s advice and a new focus on kingly “vertu” (l. 741-742). Orode stresses his “effroi” concerning an assassination and tells Sillace never to speak of it again (l. 740-741). The verb “pâlir” David K. Wagner 284 underscores the physical nature of the king’s fear of his inclination to kill the general. However, the king cannot remove the solution of a murder from his mind. He contrasts his “vertu” with “raisons d’État” but then again mentions an “attentat” (l. 742-744). Now that he has considered an assassination, he continually returns to the idea as a solution for his powerful fear of the general. Orode’s reference to “raisons d’État” underscores the Machiavellian nature of Sillace’s proposal. Further, the rhyme of “État” and “attentat” underscores the way in which Orode might justify an assassination for the good of the state (l. 743-744). Orode’s perceived need to eliminate Suréna’s supposed threat to his power, driven by his continual fear of the general, makes this course of action an option which he cannot fully discredit in his own mind. Bates McDermott suggests that Orode is being “sincere” in this passage and truly does not wish to follow Sillace’s advice (207). I would argue that the king, while being sincere, simply cannot shake the powerful influence of his fear, which clouds his rational abilities and returns his thoughts incessantly to the benefits of an assassination. In fact, Orode’s use of the word “lâche” accentuates the impact of fear on his decision-making process. “Lâcheté,” as Cureau de la Chambre explains, “suit ordinairement la crainte,” creating “les trahisons, les vengeances cruelles, et mille autres actions infâmes” (285). It is no surprise, then, that Orode’s fear of Suréna naturally leads him to contemplate cowardly actions that he would otherwise oppose on moral principle. Because of his fear, Orode fails to fully assess the risks of Sillace’s proposals and fails to properly evaluate them from a broader perspective. At the end of the play, Suréna is ignominiously killed in a city square with three arrows shot by an unknown person (l. 1714). Orode thus successfully removes the object of his fear. In the long-term, however, Suréna’s death creates even bigger political problems for Parthia. From an external perspective, Eurydice warns Orode that executing Suréna exposes Parthia to the risk of renewed Roman attacks without the support of an excellent general (l. 1443-1448). Within Parthia, Suréna warns the king that his people are already upset about the treaty pledging Orode’s son to a foreign princess in marriage (l. 936). In addition, after hearing about Orode’s understanding of “la politique,” Palmis tells the king that her “âme alarmée / Ne veut point de ces rois dont on n’est point aimée” (l. 1045-1046). The young woman implies that Orode’s political mentality is undermining his own power. As he continues to show disdain for his subjects, they will reject him as their leader. Palmis suggests that Orode’s political principles will kill his regime as his people will voluntarily choose another government. While Orode hears all of these warnings about the consequences of his political Royal Fear and the End Result of Absolutism in Corneille’s Suréna 285 actions, the king is not present for Suréna’s remarks as the general anticipates his own murder: Que son perfide auteur, bien qu’il cache sa main, Devienne abominable à tout le genre humain ; Et qu’il en naisse enfin des haines immortelles, Qui de tous ses sujets lui fassent des rebelles. (l. 1611-1614) According to Suréna, political machinations fail and lead to the downfall of royal authority (l. 1614). Even if Orode hides his role in the assassination, the general predicts that the king will still become loathed in the eyes of all humanity (l. 1612). Pringent suggests that Suréna shows a hero without hope, who “n’attend rien ni de la Providence, ni de la nature, ni de l’histoire” (523). Instead, I would argue that while Suréna despairs of his own safety, he hopes confidently in the ultimate triumph of the people over tyranny. In sum, Suréna and Palmis both imply that Orode’s fear-driven politics will lead to widespread revolt and his rejection as king. Orode’s subjects give him ample opportunity to reflect on these implications of his policies by expressing their concerns directly to him; yet Orode’s fear blinds him to their warnings. Corneille’s final tragedy ends frightfully: Parthia’s best general is dead, and the king has lost the loyalty of his people. The example of Orode suggests that a monarch who is controlled by his fear progressively loses the ability to rule well. Moving beyond the prescriptive nature of the passion treatises of the period, Corneille deeply explores a process through which fear can become a blinding force leading to tragically unwise political decisions, an investigation of fear which generally supports Cureau de la Chambre’s position. Orode uses his authority to eliminate a feared rival but alienates his people and makes his nation vulnerable to enemy advances. Moreover, Orode’s political ideology, which closely resembles Louis XIV’s approach to monarchical authority, amplifies the devastating effects of his fear, as the isolated king obsesses over his lack of preeminent glory. While the similarities between Orode and Louis XIV might not be very evident in 1674, at the height of absolutism’s success, they emerge more noticeably in the last decades of Louis XIV’s reign, when, as Montesquieu indicates, the absolute king indeed fears his own successful generals. It would seem that Corneille understands rather early in Louis XIV’s reign the potentially grave consequences of absolutism once a king passes the zenith of his glory and authority. In effect, then, the playwright explores one process by which absolutist French monarchy might eventually collapse. David K. Wagner 286 Bibliography Corneille, Pierre. “Suréna.” Théâtre III. Paris: Flammarion, 2006. Cureau de la Chambre, Marin. Les Caractères des Passions. Vol. 5. Paris: Jacques d’Allin, 1662. Greenberg, Mitchell. Corneille, Classicism, and the Ruses of Symmetry. New York: Cambridge UP, 1986. Koch, Erec R. The Aesthetic Body. Newark: Delaware UP, 2008. McClure, Ellen. Sunspots and the Sun King. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006. McDermott, Helen Bates. “Politics and Ambiguity in Corneille’s Suréna.” French Forum 62.3 (1977): 205-213. Merlin-Kajman, Hélène. “Corneille et le/ la politique: le double enjeu de la question.” Pratiques de Corneille. Dir. Myriam Dufour-Maître. Mont-Saint- Aignan: Publications universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2012. Montesquieu. Lettres Persanes. Paris: Larousse, 2004. Louis XIV. Mémoires. Paris: Tallandier, 2007. Pringent, Michel. Le héros et L’État dans la tragédie de Pierre Corneille. Paris: Quadrige/ PUF, 1986. Senault, Jean-François. De l’usage des passions. Paris: Fayard, 1987. Zoberman, Pierre. “Suréna: le Théâtre et son trouble.” Actes de Bâton-Rouge. Dir. Selma A. Zebouni. Paris: PFSCL, « Biblio 17-25 », 1986.