PFSCL XXXIX, 76 (2012) Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II J OHN P HILLIPS One interpretation of La Rochefoucauld’s (henceforth abbreviated as L.) Mémoires I-II 1 which has received some approval is that we read the two books as the story of how a young idealistic man, filled with chivalric notions, was greatly disappointed by the defeat of his expectations in the world, did not retire graciously, as did so many other equally disappointed contemporary “mémorialistes”, but instead betrayed his idealistic chivalric “principes” and joined the Fronde with the intention of getting revenge 2 . This paper, by a detailed reading of Mémoires I-II, will attempt to show that there are found in the text neither the “principes” nor the various motivations alleged to be L.’s; rather L.’s own explanations of his actions are clear and internally consistent, and his point of view is that of a noble very much aggrieved by, and determined to act against, the various political actions taken against the nobility, first by Richelieu 3 (henceforth abbreviated as R.) and then by Mazarin (henceforth abbreviated as M.) 4 . 1 All references are to the Pléaide edition. This paper would not have been possible without the help of Mila and Georgette S. Kagan. 2 Three recent critics (Hipp, Lafond [“L. et les enjeux de l’écriture”, 1998, 139-156 (= 1996, 199-213), and “Morale aristocratique et augustinisme dans l’œuvre de L.”, 1998, 91-100 (= 1996, 155-163)] and Hepp) who share a similar view of L. in his Mémoires, will for convenience sake as well as for the sake of greater clarity be treated together. In this paper I am primarily focussing on Hepp’s (1984, 129- 140) argument, as this is the most forceful and complete statement of this point of view (though her article, unlike this paper, is only partly concerned with the Mémoires). 3 See for example the complaints of Soissons as cited by Jouanna, Devoir, 361. 4 Mousnier, in his comments on Hepp, gives a concise picture of the “circonstances politiques” of the reigns of Henri IV, Louis XIII and Louis XIV and how a “grande transformation dans la constitution coutumière” was perceived by the nobility as, and was in fact, a serious threat to the status and power of the nobility of the time. The usual, customary routes of the “vieilles familles” to power, prestige, etc. John Phillips 112 This does not mean that one may not find the limitations, distortions, etc. one might expect in any strongly stated point of view about a very controversial period, but rather that an attempt to read this as the story of L.’s betrayal of the values of a chivalric fantasy is lacking sufficient support in the text. As stated, it has been claimed, by Hepp followed at least in part by Lafond 5 , that L., unlike other disappointed “mémorialistes”, did not retire, were being closed during this period as the Crown changed its way of governing and specifically in the way it chose the particular individuals who were to be its representatives throughout the realm. 5 Lafond (1998, 151-152 [= 1996, 209-210]) is included here in part because in his brief reference to Hepp he seems to be in substantial agreement with her argument. And Hepp, though she does not refer to Hipp (1976), seems to make many of the same points as Hipp. Thus Hipp (273) claims that L. returned to politics after his illusions (276) evaporated and his ambitions collided with reality as a result of the Fronde. The Mémoires allow us to follow the steps of his disenchantment (278). What Don Quixote found in fiction, L. sought in his memory and in history. Since there had been for him no “issue glorieuse” and since he could not blossom at Court, he needed to return in memory to the situations which flattered his “amour-propre”, for his “mémoires” were a “compensation à la blessure secrète infligée à son orgueil”. Like other “mémorialistes” he thought he had to “exalter” the person he thought he was in order to “revaloriser” (275) what he was in his own eyes and in the eyes of others. Since he grew up in a “climat romanesque” we find much of the same in his work. He saw himself as a “chevalier de la Table Ronde” fighting to deliver his “Dame”. The “Don Quichotte en lui” finds, in his fight with R., the same (276) “géants et enchanteurs” as Don Quixote did. Because (277) L. was also ambitious, he was often “séduit par les mirages de la gloire” which led him to have an incorrect sense of his own greatness. Although Hepp’s argument concerning L.’s attempt to be a perfect “chevalier” may have some merit, there are at least two questionable aspects of her general approach. First, she too often simply ignores what L. presents as significant. Thus she ignores his repeated references to the situation of the nobility in relation to R., M. and the Crown as well as his reactions to all this as himself a member of this nobility, and she ignores his often stated grounds for mentioning or omitting events and people contemporaneous with his account. Second, she seems to assume from the outset that her argument, that L. is striving to be a perfect “chevalier”, is obvious and correct and so she can elaborate on this in such a way as to suggest that elements she adds are implied in, or suggested by, or supported by, his text, but without needing to cite textual evidence. So, in a way suggesting that we are hearing L.’s own claims, she mentions as self-evident a number of elements: his desire to “ériger une statue” to his virtue, his reliance on a “pur idéalisme” (126), his description of Anne as his “dame élue” (126), his description of himself as the “chevalier-servant”, as the “chevalier consacré à sa dame comme Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 113 but betrayed certain “principes”, the betrayal of which culminates in his joining the civil war. These “principes” are presented as the most important motivating factors for L. throughout the Mémoires. Though it is not clearly shown where in his text L. states these “principes” 6 they have been summarized as L.’s desire to be, in general but especially in relation to his “beloved”, Anne, a “chevalier sans peur et sans reproche”, the “dévot chevalier-servant de la reine”, who is “malheureuse” et persécutée”, as is, of course, often the case with the beloveds of “chevaliers sans peur et sans reproche” 7 . It is further claimed that L. has striven to present one with a picture of a “parfait gentilhomme”, worthy of a “chevaleresque” family heritage passed down from the Crusades, a “parfait gentilhomme” lost in a world where he alone embodies this heritage, surrounded by people entirely unworthy of him and his ideals (“des gens tous méprisables”, “cette legion de médiocres”), a picture, that is to say, that one is told L. paints of L. himself 8 . L. is also said to use this “pur idéalisme”, which is said to have un saint à…Dieu” acting as a “martyre de sa cause” who goes through a “nuit obscure” (127), as someone who is trying to lead Anne on the “sentiers de la vertu” (128), as someone who sees her as “innocence opprimée” (136), as someone who is dedicated to the “culte des vraies vertus” and the “culte des valeurs” (129), as someone who sees himself as the incarnation of “idéalisme chevaleresque”, and so on. This, however, is not at all the way he represents himself or his situation, nor, more importantly, does he use these expressions. 6 Hepp begins her argument with the assertion that L., unlike other mémorialistes, has betrayed what she calls his “principes”; however, she goes on for pages without citing what L. says these “principes” are and how what he did would be a betrayal of them, and thus builds a case against him based only on her assumptions and without letting him speak for himself. 7 It has frequently been noted that this kind of language often was used by the nobility, as is pointed out, for example, by Mousnier (142): “Quant à la fidélité chevaleresque, c’était la forme que prenait l’action politique dans ce milieu de soldats héréditaires animés par l’idéal du chevalier et par le point d’honneur”, but not in the way suggested here by Hepp, which omits all references to the actual political situation in which the nobility found itself and about which L. is quite clear (see for example pp. 126, 127-128, 131. See also for an earlier period Jouanna, et al., La France de la Renaissance. Histoire et dictionnaire, 162. 8 Hepp creates difficulties for her interpretation because she ignores the temporal succession of the narration, that is, she omits the context in which different events took place over time, and she lumps together things which are only superficially similar, and this in addition to omitting L.’s own explanations. It seems she does this in part because she claims she understands why L. presents what he does, namely (129) “Qu’ajouter à un tel portrait pour en faire l’incarnation même de l’idéalisme chevaleresque, on ne voit pas” (and see her comments pp. 128 ff., on Montrésor, Béthune, La Rivière, Noirmoutier). John Phillips 114 served as his guide, in such a way as never to miss an opportunity to point out the faults and failures of others, nor ever to miss including anything which might reflect unfavorably upon others 9 (a further betrayal of his alleged values) nor ever to miss an opportunity to omit many things which might detract from his own glory 10 . This interpretation seems to be proposed without engaging, or even acknowledging, that L. was offering his own explanation of his motives and of his “omissions” as well as giving a very clear organization and structure to Mémoires I-II. In response to these claims (and leaving aside the difficulties 11 concerning the text of the Mémoires but accepting that L. wanted Mémoires I- II to precede Mémoires III-VI) it seems clear that, just as Mémoires I may most easily and profitably be read as a careful, detailed description of how 9 Hepp claims (129) that this is in part due to the fact that L. wished to insure that “…le prince de Marcillac apparaît rigoureusement isolé dans sa générosité héroique…”. The relevant matters here will be addressed in the paper but one can note that L. is consistent with his own stated objectives of writing only about what he participated in and omitting what was well known. In addition there are a number of instances where he acknowledges the efforts of others on his behalf (for example, La Meilleraye) or their gratitude (for example, Mme de Chevreuse, Anne, etc.). And most importantly, since he never makes such claims about his own virtue, it seems unnecessary to account for his “failure” to recognize the instances of the virtues of others for whose omission Hepp finds him blameworthy. 10 Hepp (134-135) says that the “critique de la conduite” of L. is easy to make but she singles out four significant and noteworthy (and to her, apparently, shocking “…on s’étonne…”) examples: 1that one (L.) who presented himself as a “dévot chevalier-servant de la reine” never mentioned the birth of Louis XIV; 2that there was no mention of the “nobles caractères” who were all around L.; 3that L. refused the “ouvertures…à sa carrière” which R. offered him because he preferred “l’inaction” and because he “cherche des prétextes…plutôt que des raisons pour se dérober à la possibilité de faire sinon de grandes choses, au moins des choses réelles” (see, contra Hepp, Jouanna, Devoir, 40-41); 4and that since he will have to break with the Court anyway, he waits for the “futile affaire du tabouret refusé à une épouse qu’il ne comble pas d’égards” to do so. For some of this there is absolutely no support in the text, and for other parts of this there are more substantive explanations which will be addressed in the text of this paper. And as for the question of his relations to his spouse, I think it is generally agreed that the pursuit of “honneurs”, etc. by the nobility did not wait upon the demonstration of their true love for their spouses or their families; see below in the text for more on this, as well as Jouanna, Devoir, 16 on the importance of not simply being noble but being recognized as such. S. Bertiere (La Vie du Cardinal, 218) also reminds one that it was Condé who made this request. 11 The editors of the Pléiade edition (1964, 13 ff.) consider the history of this text as one of the most complicated of all French texts. Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 115 L., as a noble, found himself more and more alienated from R. primarily because of R.’s treatment of other nobles and especially of Anne, so Mémoires II may most easily and profitably be seen as a detailed description of how L., as a noble, was more and more alienated from M. primarily because of his treatment of the nobility. In Mémoires II L. also became alienated from Anne as she chose to work with M. to secure her own position and that of her children. Taken together Mémoires I and II present a clear, detailed and consistent narration of the reasons that led L. to join the civil war, and virtually all of these reasons are presented as being directly related to how R., M. and the Crown “mistreated” the nobility. L.’s alienation at the end of Mémoires II is more serious than that at the end of Mémoires I: the condition of the nobility had continued its deterioration into the second book, the elites were considerably more hostile toward M. than toward R., and L., because alienated from Anne, had lost the personal contact with the Crown that he initially had had. However L. has given a coherent, plausible explanation for his activities in his narration, thereby allowing one to understand his actions in the terms in which he understood them, and this is true even if it were shown that L. was wrong in different instances (that is, was too biased in favor of Anne, too uncritical in favor of the nobility, too forgiving of Anne’s treacherous relations with Spain and of Chevreuse’s many unhelpful actions, too blind to dangers R. could see, disinclined to understand how precarious R.’s position was and to give him credit for how often he exhibited moderation 12 , too often favorably disposed toward himself, etc.). But any reading which rejects L.’s explanation will be of interest or of help only insofar as it first states clearly his reasoning and then demonstrates how his explanation is inadequate. To address the structure and the tendentious “omissions” first, if one examines what L. in fact wrote, starting in Mémoires I, one sees that, contrary to what is claimed, L. was quite clear and careful both about the overall structure of Mémoires I as well as about which elements he thought should be included or excluded, and why. An indication that Mémoires I is meant to be taken as a unit is that R. was virtually the very first (39) and the very last thing (58) written about, and the most important figure in Mémoires I, whose death ends the book. In both places, L. said similar things about R., and although he was critical of him, he exhibited a just appreciation of his contributions to the country ((39), (58)). L. also explicitly stated on several occasions what he planned to include and to omit, as 12 Chevallier Louis XIII 314. John Phillips 116 (47) he said 13 that since he did not plan to write a history nor to speak of himself in general but only in to regard to events he was involved in, he had no intention of writing about everything, especially since much of that was known. Therefore it is unfair and irrelevant for Hepp to criticize L. for not mentioning things which he omitted, such as the birth of Louis XIV, when the explanation of the omission—namely, that he was not present for the event, that it was very well known, and that it did not form part of what he was interested in writing about—is consistent with his stated objectives in writing (and it certainly is not omitted to enhance his image of himself nor to detract from others). Early on he stated that (39) he would only write about what had been a part of, so he would omit details (43) of the taking of La Rochelle, a well known event; he also would omit (45) some of Marie de Medicis’ misfortunes, as also well known. When he began to write about Mme de Chevreuse, he indicated 14 (40) why he had to include things which preceded the events about which he would write but of which he had not been a part, as they were necessary for understanding what happened afterward. In the matter of La Rochelle, he made a point 15 (43) of stating that he was including something because it was not generally known. In (57) discussing the Cinq-Mars affair, he said he would say nothing of the unhappy outcome of their projects as these were well known. So too in Mémoires II, just after M. had come on the scene, another example is found where (65) L. wrote 16 that there was no need to write about M.’s good and bad qualities as these were well known, but he would write about what he had learned on those occasions where he had some personal contact with him. L. clearly stated his reasons for including what he included, thus omissions L. is alleged to have tendentiously made seem adequately explained by L.’s own criteria. To take up L.’s motivations next, the most important statement of these comes several pages into the first book. If one considers Mémoires I as a 13 “…mais comme je ne prétends pas écrire l’histoire, ni parler de moi que dans ce qui a du rapport aux personnes avec qui j’ai été lié d’intérêt et d’amitié, je ne toucherai que les choses où j’ai été mêlé, puisque le reste est assez connu.” 14 “Cette liaison a produit tant de choses extraordinaires qu’il me paraît nécessaire de rapporter ici quelques-unes de celles qui s’étaient passées devant le temps dont je dois parler.” 15 “…mais tout le monde ne sait pas que le Cardinal accusa la Reine d’avoir concerté cette entreprise avec le duc de Buckingham, pour faire la paix des huguenots et pour lui donner prétexte de revenir à la cour et de revoir la Reine.” 16 “Ses bonnes et ses mauvaises qualités ont été assez connues et assez publiées, pendant qu’il a vécu et après sa mort, pour me dispenser de les écrire: je ne parlerai que de celles que j’ai remarquées dans les occasions où j’ai eu quelque chose à traiter avec lui.” Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 117 whole, it has two parts. L. first (39-46/ 7) explained how he came to the mature understanding of the world he had at the time he became an active participant therein, and then (47-58) discussed events down to the death of R. (implying that his explanation of these later events (47-58) is based on what was first (39-46/ 7) described). This first (39-47/ 6) section itself has two parts, an initial part (39-46), the presentation of the experiences which led to L.’s mature understanding, and a brief second part (46-47), the statement of that mature understanding. Since much of the criticism here addressed depends on these lines (46-47) where he states his mature understanding, these must be discussed first. It is important to note that, in all he says (39-46) before these (46-47) key lines (lines which, summarizing and explaining his attitudes, are essential for justifying his thoughts and actions in the remainder of Mémoires I and II), the most important elements all have to do with the way in which R. “mistreated” the nobility, including Anne. L. stressed (46-47) how being himself a noble raised and educated in the noble tradition had been crucial in forming his attitudes toward the Crown in general, but especially toward R., at times the most powerful person in the government and, from the nobles’ point of view, their fiercest opponent. It will be seen that, given his political description of his own situation and that of the nobility, it does not serve any purpose for L. to portray himself as the “chevalier sans peur et sans reproche”, the “dévot chevalier-servant de la reine”. If one examines these key lines (46-47) stating his mature understanding of the Court, R., the Crown and the nobility then, it is clear that L. was providing a rationale for his subsequent actions. L. explained 17 (46) that because of the events he had just narrated (39-46, to be considered below) he had been brought up 18 in the feelings and attitudes then prevailing among the nobles, namely, that the amount of blood shed and the number of “fortunes” destroyed by R. and by the Crown made all the nobles consider themselves as having been defeated and as having passed from freedom into slavery, with the result that they hated R.’s ministry. L. himself thought 19 that R.’s government had been unfair and so, when it was time to 17 “Tant de sang répandu et tant de fortunes renversées avaient rendu odieux le ministère du cardinal de Richelieu; la douceur de la régence de Marie de Medicis était encore présente, et tous les grands du Royaume, qui se voyaient abattus, croyaient avoir passé de la liberté à la servitude. J’avais été nourri dans ces sentiments, et je m’y confirmai encore par ce que je viens de dire: la domination du cardinal de Richelieu me parut injuste…”. 18 On the idea of “nourriture” in this kind of context see Jouanna, Devoir, p. 70. 19 “…la domination du cardinal de Richelieu me parut injuste, et je crus que le parti de la Reine était le seul qu’il fût honnête de suivre. Elle était malheureuse et John Phillips 118 assume his own place and to act, the only party which seemed acceptable to follow was Anne’s, because she, a noble, was “malheureuse et persécutée” but also because she had treated L. well, with respect and friendship. It must be emphasized that, because of the context, L.’s description of Anne connected her directly to the “political” situation, that is to say, to the relations between the Cardinal and the nobles, and the reference to Anne as “malheureuse et persécutée” (significant terminology later also used in a political context 20 ) concerned her standing as a noble, mistreated in the same way that many nobles were by R., and none of this had anything to do with any love interest L. might be alleged to have had in her. L. made clear that he saw Anne as sharing the unhappy fate of all the nobles, himself and his “maison” included, though her situation was perhaps more noteworthy because she was a woman, the Queen and, significantly, because she claimed she was especially fond of L., who was completely dependent on her. That L. was talking about a political situation is clarified by his comments on his relations with Mlle de Hautefort. She was young, beautiful, virtuous and faithful to her friends, but most important (46) to L. 21 was that she was both especially close to Anne and also R.’s enemy. Hautefort used to speak freely to L. 22 of the King’s love for her 23 , and L.’s interest in this fit well his presentation of the situation, as the kinds of things he might learn from her could be very useful to a noble in opposition to R. and to the King. Hautefort also made the Queen speak completely freely to him, again potentially useful. Whatever L.’s actual relationship might have been with Hautefort, his interest in her here was presented consistently in terms of their shared friendship with, and dependence on, Anne, and their shared opposition, as nobles, to R. and the Crown. That L.’s concern was the status of the nobility was made clearer in that one of the things Hautefort discussed with L. was the “gallantry” of Louis XIII, who was in love with her persécutée… elle me traitait avec beaucoup de bonté et de marques d’estime et de confiance.” 20 While in the Bastille, L. (54) says he saw there “un nombre infini de gens de toutes conditions et de tous sexes, malheureux et persécutés par une longue et cruelle prison.” 21 Mlle de Hautefort “… était fort jeune et d’une beauté surprenante… elle était particulièrement attachée à la Reine et ennemie du Cardinal”. 22 “Le Roi… amoureux d’elle… le Roi lui témoignait plus de passion par de longues et pénibles assiduités et par sa jalousie… . Elle me parlait de tous ses intérêts et de tous ses sentiments… et elle obligea la Reine à me dire toutes choses sans réserve.” 23 See for example Kleinman 168ff. Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 119 and so had all the usual symptoms, which led Louis to devote to her many “assiduities” and to experience much jealousy. But clearly the way Hautefort presented Louis’ relation to her was not the way L. presents his own relations to Anne or to Hautefort 24 . L. made an additional statement which has drawn critical attention about these events so important to his formation and to his understanding of the situation as a noble, writing (47) that “De moindres raisons auraient suffi pour éblouir un homme qui n’avait presque jamais rien vu et pour l’entraîner dans un chemin si opposé à sa fortune. Cette conduite m’attira bientôt l’aversion du Roi et du Cardinal et commença une longue suite de disgrâces, dont ma vie a été agitée et qui m’ont donné souvent plus de part qu’un particulier n’en devait avoir à des événements considérables; mais comme je ne prétends pas écrire l’histoire…”. Coming as this passage does 25 , 24 Chevallier Louis XIII 426-427 “Il (= Louis XIII) a lui-même dit à Monsieur qu’il était devenu le chevalier servant d’Hautefort…”. 25 Lafond (“L. et les enjeux de l’écriture”, 1998, 139-156 [= Lafond, 1996, 199- 213]) agrees with Hepp as to the explanation of this (“De moindres raisons…éblouir…opposé à sa fortune”) and of what Lafond calls the “erreurs” of L.’s “jeunesse”. He says that L.’s “éblouissement” was not only the “source” of the “échecs” of the man in the Mémoires, but that it is also “incriminé” equally in the Maximes “à plusieurs reprises”. This “échec” of L.’s political conduct is, according to Lafond, explained by L. as a consequence of “une éducation qui le vouait à un idéalisme chevaleresque totalement périmé”. Thus L., “ébloui” by the idea he gave himself of the “honneurs” and of the “devoirs” of his “rang” as well as by a certain “image de soi”, spread his “nets” too high, or high enough to ignore reality. In his analysis in “Morale aristocratique et augustinisme dans l’œuvre de L.”, 1998, 91-100 (= 1996, 155-163) Lafond seems to agree with Hipp in treating all six books of the Mémoires as without distinctions and also in discussing L.’s actions from a psychological point of view, even though Lafond himself mentions L.’s “conduite politique”. Though Lafond is clear about how the noble sense of “honneur” applies to L., it seems he chooses not to give it much weight here as a political factor. He follows Hepp in not sufficiently taking into account the fact that L., in relation to R. and M., acts as do other nobles, that is, as a noble acting against individuals perceived as threats to the power and prestige of the nobility. Lafond also follows Hepp in seeing L. as a misguided “chevalier”. In Lafond’s comments on these matters in “Morale aristocratique…” he seems to take for granted Hepp’s article though he does not cite it, and as a result he makes claims he apparently assumes have been supported elsewhere. So for example when Lafond takes up the matter of L.’s “éblouissement” and his “longues suites de disgrâces” but the sentences in which this occurs are primarily about Hautefort as a friend of Anne and enemy of R., and all of this is in the long paragraph (Mém. 46-47) which is almost entirely about how he has come to oppose R. and the Crown because of their treatment of the nobility. When Lafond speaks of L. as John Phillips 120 right after so much said in a short space (46-47) about the mistreatment of the nobility by R. and the King and about L.’s own sentiments about these events, it seems difficult to understand the notion of “éblouissement” here (however Hepp claims it may have been used in other contemporary works) as a psychological term describing the feelings of love of the “dévot chevalier-servant de la reine” Anne, a “chevalier sans peur et sans reproche”. Though L. mentioned his youth, and thereby suggested he might have been overly impressionable, he was not talking about himself as a man in love, and it is clear that the results of the actions into which he was drawn brought down on him exactly the kinds of political mistreatment of the nobles by R. and Louis XIII that he has been talking about from the very beginning (39-46). The “fortune” he was interested in here was the same as that which he has just discussed in regard to the nobility, the fortune associated with the “sang répandu” and the “fortunes renversées” of the “grands du Royaume” and was not related to one’s “fortune” in chivalric love. So too the “aversion” of the King and R. led to “disgrâces” and a “vie agitée” which resembled the actions taken by R. and Louis XIII against other nobles including L.’s father 26 . Anne’s “serviteur” he is referring to a word used in L.’s text, but when he also describes him as a “martyre” he has added something which is both not there and misleading, as it implies that “serviteur” means something it does not in this context, and thus he can assert that L. “joue les chevaliers”. 26 After spending many pages making the case for L. as the “chevalier sans peur et sans reproche” Hepp later (135-136) thinks she sees L. indicating some ambiguity, some criticism of this attitude of his, as she claims that when he writes of the fact that he was “nourri” in these traditions and saw R.’s rule as unjust, he was indicating that this was a fault of his “éducation”. She claims that there is “souvent allégué par le mémorialiste” (no citations) a “mauvaise étoile” which L. uses to explain a variety of bad things which happen to him, such as when he is a “victime des malheurs de Mme de Chevreuse” in the matter of the confusion of book colors (51-52). L. however makes no such claim about a “mauvaise étoile” in his text (51) and in fact provides for it a more naturalistic explanation, namely that it was a “méprise bizarre” (which for the reader is perhaps a sufficient explanation for a mistake made about a secret arrangement during a period of great duress). Hepp also cites a passage (which in fact is several pages earlier (47- 48) in which she claims that L. represents himself as an “astre noire” responsible for an “échec” for his men during a military campaign in Flandres in 1635 by quoting: “Je revins avec ce qu’il y avait de volontaires, et je leur portai malheur, car nous fumes tous chassés…”. This does not support her claim because it does not say what she claims, since the passage continues “…chassés, sur le prétexte qu’on parlait trop librement de ce qui c’était passé dans cette campagne; mais la principale raison fut le plaisir que sentit le Roi de faire dépit à la Reine et à Mlle de Hautefort en m’éloignant de la cour.” (See Chevallier, Louis XIII, 512 for this Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 121 Having thus interpreted this statement (46-47) of his views, one sees that L. had presented in the immediately preceding passages (39-46) both the specific incidents which constituted the evidence and justification for his ideas about the nobles’ mistreatment as well as the way he had arrived at his attitudes toward the Crown and R.. Much in the opening pages concerns both the character of R. and what he did to consolidate and maintain his power in general but also in relation to the nobility. R. strengthened his power in part by his clever manipulation of others, and one objective of L.’s presentation was to show the strengths and weaknesses of R. and of the principal individuals, and how R. exploited these last. One is shown the large number of nobles mistreated by R., which mistreatments serve to clarify for the narrator, L., the “truth” of the noble perspective he adopted on these events. His summary lines at the opening (39) of the Mémoires on R., himself a noble, are by no means simply negative (equally true of the summation at the end of Mémoires I) 27 . R., though harsh, was also very intelligent, even though it was claimed that he divided people into those devoted to his interests (whom he rewarded) and those he hated (whom he tried to destroy). But R.’s primary interest was to establish the King’s authority and thereby his own as well. It was only as a part of this that he wished to harm the “grandes maisons du Royaume” just as it was only as a part of this that he wished to harm the Huguenots; and it was only as a part of this that he wished to attack and weaken “la maison d’Autriche” because it was a power which greatly threatened France. The implication is that, whatever actions R. may have taken in L.’s subsequent narration, however emphatic and clear L. was about their harmful effects on his own “maison” and on the “maisons” of other nobles, as well as whatever the matter.) L. was not, and no where claimed to be, an “astre noir” bringing bad luck, but he explicitly says he was the victim, as indeed were all the “volontaires” (and as were Anne and Hautefort for that matter) of Louis XIII’s ill will. Hepp’s explanation of this passage is incorrect and this then can not serve to support the other dubious claim about the “mauvaise étoile” that damaged his life. So too Hepp’s reference (137) to M. being protected by a “bonne étoile”: there is no such thing mentioned in the text, nor implied for that matter, but her mentioning it may give the misleading impression that this forms part of a pattern indicated by L. that somehow includes the influence of the stars. 27 “Le cardinal…gouvernait l’État…il avait l’esprit vaste et pénétrant, l’humeur âpre et difficile; il était libéral, hardi dans ses projets, timide pour sa personne. Il voulut établir l’autorité du Roi et la sienne propre par la ruine des huguenots et des grandes maisons du Royaume, pour attaquer ensuite la maison d’Autriche et abaisser une puissance si redoutable à la France. Tout ce qui n’était pas dévoué à ses volontés était exposé à sa haine, et il ne gardait point de bornes pour élever ses créatures ni pour perdre ses ennemis”. John Phillips 122 significance of R.’s long-held but rejected passion for Anne, one is not precluded from seeing these actions of R. as having been in the service of something larger than, say, simple avarice (however much R. may have gained for himself and his family). And significantly there is the implicit comparison with M. who will be shown to have none of these saving graces. During the time R. was building his power at the expense of the nobles, the King was described (39-40) as weak, as difficult, as “hating the world”, and as one whose interests 28 were not those a king should have. He wished to be governed, yet was not able to tolerate this, and the implication may be that this was something R. saw which allowed him to try to expand his own power. The King was also jealous, and R.’s own jealousy led him to make the King even more jealous, partly to assuage his own jealousy but partly to enhance his own power. As a result, R. made the King’s relations with Anne (already poor because of her failure to produce an heir and their temperamental incompatibility) more difficult. Anne on the other hand (40) is described as having almost no faults, but having much goodness, sweetness and “politesse”, although L. would soon show only too well how many shortcomings he later learned she had. Chevreuse was beautiful and full of “esprit”, but even at the outset L. was clear that her ambition made her a source of “malheurs” for everyone 29 , even for her beloved friend Anne. So on the occasion of Gaston’s marriage she turned a joyful situation into a disturbing one, and partly because of Chalais’ attachment to her 30 , he became involved in the plot which led to his beheading, which plot was meant to have Gaston marry Anne after Louis’ death. This again shows how R. was able to use others’ actions to enhance his own power, here by alienating Louis from Anne (and that Anne may have wanted Louis out of the way to marry Gaston troubled Louis’ relationship to Anne until the moment of his death 31 ). L. showed R.’s ability 28 However Chevallier Louis XIII 290 indicates that Louis was in fact quite interested in all matters related to war. 29 Louis XIII called her a “diable”, Chevallier Louis XIII 306; Chevallier 424 writes of her “… néfaste influence” and of her “… pernicieuse influence…” (531). 30 Chevallier Louis XIII 311 “Le véritable cheville ouvrière de la conspiration avait été Mme de Chevreuse”; see also 319. 31 (61-62) “Cependant la Reine et Monsieur…cherchaient…toutes sortes de voies pour effacer les impressions qu’il avait de leur conduite. J’ai su de M. de Chavigny même qu’étant allé trouver le Roi, de la part de la Reine, pour lui demander pardon de tout ce qui lui avait pu déplaire, elle le chargea particulièrement de le supplier de ne point croire qu’elle fût entrée dans l’affaire de Chalais, ni qu’elle eût jamais trempé dans le dessein d’épouser Monsieur après que Chalais aurait exécuté la conjuration qu’il avait faite contre la personne du Roi. Il répondit a M. de Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 123 to exploit to his own advantage and to the detriment of Anne another situation created by Chevreuse (41), the Buckingham matter. Again R.’s jealousy was alleged to be a prime motivation for his actions in continuing to turn Louis against Anne. R. showed a certain cunning in trying to use Buckingham’s former mistress against him but Buckingham was the cleverer on that occasion, which upset R. because he lost another opportunity to manipulate the King against Anne. R. (43) even tried to turn Chevreuse into someone he could use 32 for his own purposes, though this did not work. And it is here that one is told (43-44) about R.’s (as yet, according to L., unknown) claim about the complicity of Anne in Buckingham’s return, allegedly to help the Huguenots and arrange a peace, actually to allow Buckingham to be near his beloved Anne. R. also displayed cleverness in regard to Marie de Medici. Because she then hated R. (44), she told Louis XIII that R. was in love with Anne, which upset the King so much he was willing to remove R.; but because R. was able to take the measures necessary to protect himself, Marie’s hesitations wasted so much time that they led to her own destruction. And while R. waited to take his revenge on her, he discovered and punished those nobles who had worked with Marie against him. R.’s astuteness and ability were in evidence when, after the Day of the Dupes (45), he got the King to agree to the fall of Marie, and her imprisonment was only part of her “malheurs”, which themselves (in turn) led to the various “malheurs” (45-46) of many other people of “qualité”, and here L. gave a partial list 33 of nobles, including his father, R. had harmed in this particular regard as well as in other matters. This is the material which directly precedes and which provides evidence and justification for L.’s summary statement (46-47) about his mature attitude as a noble toward the Crown and especially toward R. And all of this is directly connected to treatment of the nobility and none is related to chivalric love. Chavigny sans s’émouvoir: ‘En l’état où je suis, je lui dois pardonner; mais je ne suis pas obligé de la croire.’” 32 Chevallier Louis XIII 421-422. 33 “…et qu’elle (= Marie) enveloppa dans sa perte un grande nombre de personnes de qualité. Le grand prieur de Vendôme et le maréchal d’Ornano…le duc de Vendôme y était encore; la princesse de Conti et le duc de Guise, son frère, furent chassés; le maréchal de Bassompierre fut mis à la Bastille; le maréchal de Marillac eut la tête tranchée; on ôta les sceaux à son frère…Mme de Chevreuse fut reléguée à Tours, n’ayant de crime …que d’être attaché(s) à la Reine…Mon père se trouva exposé, comme la plus grande partie de la cour, à la persécution du Cardinal; il fut soupçonné d’être dans les intérêts de Monsieur, et il eut ordre d’aller dans une maison qu’il avait auprès de Blois.” John Phillips 124 Once L. has stated his mature understanding and how he came to it, the reader can understand how the events in the second half (47-58) of Mémoires I fit the pattern of showing R.’s hostility toward the nobility and how this alienated L. and the other nobles. Once war started with Spain, one sees how some disaffected nobles took advantage of this to act against their enemy, and how R. responded. L., after several battles, was forced by Louis to leave the Court as a way to spite Anne and Hautefort, though the official explanation was different. During (48) the war’s second year, R. made mistakes, Corbie was taken, and his noble enemies had the reasons they needed to enter into cabals against R.’s authority and even his life. But R. was able to foil this plot and the war later went better. Though L. still could not return to Court, this gave him the opportunity to act as a typical noble supporter of the Queen. Since Chevreuse was banished to Tours, Anne recommended L. to her and thus he could run errands for both Anne and Chevreuse while still in the army and not yet allowed to return to the Court. This allowed him to see more of how R. treated Anne and so increased L.’s hostility toward R.. After L.’s father’s disgrace ended, L. returned to Court at the time Anne was accused of communication with Spain, a “crime d’État”, as a result of which she was persecuted, her possessions were searched, her servants interrogated, and it was suggested that she be arrested, be transported to Le Havre (50) and have her marriage broken and herself repudiated. It was at this low point in her life that Anne, with only 34 L. and Hautefort as confidants, suggested to L. that he kidnap Anne and Hautefort away to Brussels. L. then comments Quelque difficulté et quelque péril qui me parussent dans un tel projet, je puis dire qu’il me donna plus de joie que je n’en avais eu de ma vie; j’étais en un âge où on aime à faire des choses extraordinaires et éclatantes, et je ne trouvais pas que rien le fût advantage que d’enlever en même temps la Reine au Roi, son mari, et au cardinal de Richelieu, qui en était jaloux, et d’ôter Mlle de Hautefort au Roi, qui en était amoureux. 35 34 For Anne’s distress during this period see for example Kleinman 190 f. 35 It is only by ignoring all that has preceded in the narration (and also what comes after) as well as the political aspects of L.’s narrative that Hepp (127) can say of this passage: “Ainsi est consacrée la vocation chevaleresque du prince de Marcillac au service d’Anne”, which she connects and presumably supports (126) by referring to R.’s “domination” and Anne being “malheureuse et persécutée” and L. being her “serviteur” (not quoted) as if all these terms were near each other and as if all were used in an erotic-chivalric context, which is not the case. She even tries out (127) the notion of whether “le chevalier-servant de la reine” might actually become “le martyre de sa cause”, which she ultimately rejects for lack of textual evidence but which she thinks is, in effect, what L. means. And it is presumably Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 125 It is important to note that though this may be taken, as it is by Hepp and others, for some fantasy on the part of a “chevalier sans peur et sans reproche”, the “dévot chevalier-servant de la reine” Anne, to kidnap to safety his beloved 36 , it really fits better into L.’s analysis of the situation of the nobles and their mistreatment by R. and the King. Though L. acknowledged how enticing such adventures might be for a young man, such as he (born in 1613) was then (1637), what he primarily stressed was how such an action would allow him to harm the foes of the nobles and help two noble women, victims of R., in that he could: 1take a Queen from her King, which would also be taking a wife from a husband; 2take a Queen from a Cardinal-Ministre, who was “jaloux” of her; 3take a young beautiful woman from a King who was in love with her. And this was a very brief incident, not dwelt on long 37 . One cannot fairly reject the clear political and nobiliary motivations in L.’s account and substitute others without showing that his reasoning is inadequate. Almost everything in L.’s prior narration concerns R.’s and Louis XIII’s actions against the nobility, not L.’s “love” for Anne, nor for Hautefort, nor for anyone else for that matter. Thus here L. seems much less like a “chevalier sans peur et sans reproche”, a “dévot chevalier-servant de la reine” Anne, who has fallen out of the world of “Amadis” or out of some “roman d’amour” 38 and much more like the typical (16 th -17 th ) “malcontent” noble. After the matter of Anne and Spain, none of the anticipated bad consequences happened, but L.’s narration shows several clear instances of how complicated matters were, how difficult it was for a noble to stay loyal to noble friends without running into trouble with the Crown. As a first example one sees how L. (with Anne forbidden to speak to Chevreuse) took on the task of informing Chevreuse, for Anne’s sake, that all was now well. His father and Chavigny (50-51) explained the dangers awaiting both L. as an individual and his “maison” if he were to go to Tours and not break with Chevreuse as ordered. It was difficult for L. not to go to see her, but he agreed, and in a manner of speaking he “obeyed” the royal order, in that he with some idea in mind of some mystical love experience of this “chevalier” that she can speak of L.’s exile as “… la nuit obscure acceptée dans la sérénité… la nuit obscure non plus acceptée mais choisie…”. 36 Chevallier Louis XIII 534 is not sure this idea occurred to Anne, and notes it would have been virtually impossible, and obviously was soon dropped from consideration. 37 As we are told (50) in the very next sentence “… au Roi, qui en était amoureux. Heureusement les choses changèrent: la Reine ne se trouva pas coupable….”. 38 Delpech also thinks (57-59) that L.’s reading of Amadis des Gaules and L’Astrée have made him “…impatient d’imiter les héros…”. John Phillips 126 himself did not literally “see” her but had a friend explain that she and Anne would be able to live in “repos” as long as they did not have any “commerce”. In this way therefore L. had remained true to the noble code, and had acted to protect his “maison”, but had also fulfilled his duty to another noble, the Queen, and had maintained the appearance (but only the appearance) of literally having “followed” the royal order, though by actually violating its intention, he had risked seriously falling afoul of the authorities. As a second example of the difficulties of remaining loyal to noble friends, L. narrated the strange misunderstanding (“méprise bizarre”) due to the wrong color book being sent (leading to much “disgrâce” for Chevreuse and some for L. because of an unavoidable “enchaînement d’accidents”) because of which misunderstanding Chevreuse thought she had to flee to Spain (52), which renewed the suspicions of R. and Louis XIII in regard to Anne. This in turn led to a further complication. An inquiry (52-53) uncovered L.’s contact with Chevreuse, and it was suspected L. might have planned to kidnap her to some foreign country. L., as a noble, had thought his aid to her was an obligation owed to someone of her “qualité”, but L. went to Paris in order to spare his father any difficulty. L. (54) was interviewed by R. who, annoyed with his response, sent him to the Bastille for a few days and then released him. Again in conformity with L.’s overall narrative, all this confirmed his opinion of R.’s attitude toward the nobility as L. saw clearly the “image affreuse” of R’s domination and experienced it first-hand, for besides his own treatment, he named some of the nobles he claimed he saw in the Bastille, who were “malheureux et persécutés”, and the sight of these “pitoyables objets” made the “haine naturelle” he already had for R. stronger. Again one sees how this whole incident led to a reaction on the part of L. as a noble, and how it hardened him against R.’s “administration” because of what it did to the nobility. And this was what one has been prepared for by L.’s early (46-47) explanation of the attitudes he had when he became an active participant on the scene. L. makes clear however that the difficulties he had to undergo in supporting the noble cause were more than simply tolerable because he had the support and gratitude of those nobles, especially Anne and Hautefort, whose opinion he valued; in fact Chevreuse was so grateful to L. for his efforts, she drew the interest of the King of Spain, who visited her twice seeking information concerning L.’s stay in the Bastille (54). And the exile (54-55) L. suffered for a couple of years was not only in the same worthy cause, but it was made considerably easier by a number of factors 39 . He 39 It seems that Hepp (127) is mistaken in insisting on seeing this in the context of chivalric love, suggesting that it is part of L.’s playing the “martyre” for love, his Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 127 himself was young, so waiting was not so difficult. But more significantly, more to the point for this paper, he (and everyone else) knew that both R. and the King were in failing health, so it was expected that a considerable change would take place 40 . L. enjoyed being with his family, and the country was filled with exiles in similar situations, so there were plenty of nobles with whom to socialize. Thus it would be a great mistake to claim, as Hepp does, that L., by waiting away from the Court, was misrepresenting (for purposes of self-glorification) himself as making a difficult and in effect unreasonable sacrifice of his opportunities for worldly advancement for someone he “loved”, Anne. Rather, L. shows clearly that this was a reasonable, practical calculation (though not without its discomforts) taking into consideration his own situation and interests, as well as the objective condition of the health of R. and the King. When he was finally allowed to return to the army, he had done so well, R.’s hatred calmed, he offered L. a position and showed him the great possibilities he could have by cooperating with R.. Still true to his cause, L. declined these opportunities 41 . He did so, however, not from some mistaken notion of chivalry or to glorify himself, but because Anne specifically told him she did not want him to be beholden to R., so that L. would then have the liberty to be R.’s opponent when she could openly be R.’s enemy, which she expected would happen soon. Thus (55) he gladly gave up what fortune might offer him and stayed at Vertueil, even though the life there would have been “inutile” and “languissante” if not for the fact that he was completely dependant on someone, Anne, who foresaw for him the “espérance” of a significant change. He waited both because he was a noble remaining faithful to the cause of the nobility oppressed by R. and because he would be amply rewarded. Anne’s future enmity toward R. was assured, and it was clear that time was on her side and on L.’s side as well. And (55) the “changement” foreseen was visible to all, as all saw the “mauvaise santé” of R., even though his power over Louis XIII had reached to point that Louis XIII had “nuit obscure” as a “pénitence légère” since he has clearly explained why it is tolerable and why it is a rational choice. 40 “J’étais jeune; la santé du Roi et celle du Cardinal s’affaiblissaient, et je devais tout attendre d’un changement. J’étais heureux dans ma famille; j’avait à souhait tous les plaisirs de la campagne; les provinces voisines étaient remplies d’exilés, et le rapport de nos fortunes et de nos espérances rendait notre commerce agréable.” 41 Delpech claims (60) that Anne is the one who does not give him “…honneurs et charges…” but because “…tous les nobles montraient les mêmes dents longues”, that is to say, there is nothing more involved than a disproportion between the number of askers and the number of things to be given. John Phillips 128 ordered, before the siege of Perpignan, his children be entrusted to R. in case he should die. The final incidents (56-57) in Mémoires I fit the pattern of the other events in L.’s narration. One incident involved R.’s mistake in removing Hautefort and Chemerault from the King, replacing them with the handsome Cinq-Mars, which, again, predictably roused the hopes of the “mécontents” (here Anne, Gaston, Bouillon et al.) giving them leaders they could turn to for direction in their opposition to R.. He again prevailed against these noble malcontents but not before they were said to be so “éblouis” that they were led to become involved in the “funeste traité” with Spain. It is worth noting that L. (56), showing a more complex understanding of the idea of “éblouissement” than some would grant, here uses the word “éblouir” in a purely political context (that is, unhappy nobles blinded by Cinq-Mars’ “éclat” to the extent that they join France’s enemy to work against the King’s principle minister) and also that L. was clear that a young man might understandably be “ébloui”, but for Anne and Gaston to be so was not something one would forgive (“pardonner”). In another incident (57), it is easiest to understand L.’s actions in regard to Montrésor and Béthune as being (at least in part) another calculated action of a noble in opposition to R. L., because of the obligations his friendship required of him, felt he had to help these two noble friends, now declared criminals by R., even though L. himself had been imprisoned before for a similar act, and even though he fully expected to feel R.’s hatred because doing his duty as a noble would oppose him to R.. There may be elements of self-aggrandizement here, but omitting the overall, explicit political context leads to serious misinterpretation. In his narration, by this date (late 1642) L., despite R.’s great power, had long been in the camp of the nobles and had long seen clearly R.’s opposition to the nobles, but since he was convinced he had Anne’s backing, it was more reasonable to see this not as L. posturing to show his moral superiority but as a calculated position taken by a noble long convinced of R.’s opposition to the nobility in general and to himself and to his “maison” in particular, a position in opposition to R. and with the backing of the Queen as part of the action needed to resist the encroachments of R. on the nobility. Fulfilling one’s duty toward noble friends would rank high on a noble’s list of obligations, perhaps especially in times like those described here 42 . 42 See J.-M. Constant, La société française, Paris, Gap, 1994, pp. 31-33 (as quoted by M. Cottret in “Bilan historiographique: le sens de l’histoire”, pp. 528-529 in Introduction à la France moderne 1500-1640: Essai de psychologie historique, Paris, Albin Michel, 1998): “Au XVI e siècle comme à l’époque baroque, l’amitié joue dans la noblesse un rôle difficilement imaginable aujourd’hui. On risquait facilement sa Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 129 R. at the height of his powers returned (57) in triumph to a Paris where even the Queen and the King feared him. But R.’s much anticipated death soon arrived, and attention turned to the worsening health of the King. L. then presented a summary evaluation of R.’s achievements which, as stated, echoed the opening evaluation and which, though frank in acknowledging how much noble blood R. had spilt, did not in the least detract from the incomparable services he had rendered the country. L. goes so far as to say that R.’s accomplishments ought to “étouffer” any “ressentiments” that might be felt, so that R. would get his just praise, which looks forward to the very different presentation of M. L. will give in Mémoires II. As stated, Mémoires I is most usefully read as L.’s explanation of how he, as a noble, found himself more and more alienated from R. because of his treatment of the nobility and of Anne, and Mémoires II is most profitably read as L.’s explanation of his gradual alienation from M. and Anne. In Mémoires II L. seems even less like a “chevalier sans peur et sans reproche”, the “dévot chevalier-servant de la reine” (especially because of the extent of his alienation from Anne) and more like the noble motivated by the actions of M. which most threatened the power and prestige of the nobility 43 . The book is a careful presentation of the steps that justified L.’s loss of trust in both Anne and M., and it has two parts. First (59-76) L. presented himself as continually trying to find a way to work with Anne until it became clear that this was no longer possible as she had gone over completely to M.. Then (76-89), because he saw himself as betrayed and exploited, L. went over into open opposition to Anne, M. and the government in order to express his resentment. As M. consolidated his power by his support of Anne and her support of him, he eventually had alienated, and incurred the hatred of, a very large number of people at the Court and in Paris, as is well known. He is portrayed by L. as someone who would have done (and did vie ou sa carrière pour aider ou sauver un ami.” See also J. Truchet (pp. xii-xiii and note 1 on this incident): “Mais il était irréprochable quant au respect de la foi jurée et des liens, en quelque sorte féodaux, d’appartenance entre amis ou alliés.” 43 See Jouanna, Devoir, 231ff. who understands the noble revolt after the death of Louis XIII as a combination of the two essential elements typical of such rebellions, namely, a weak king and the prominence of “favoris”. At this time as a result, the competition among nobles was fierce and Anne was too weak to impose order. Jouanna stresses the importance that “intégrité de l’honneur”, what others thought of the nobles as well as what the nobles thought of themselves, required more urgently that its value be publicly recognized, and so the importance attributed to honors bestowed, to the “domaine des symbols” increased. At the same time, since much of this was subjective (despite being codified by usage) the suffering caused by the “blessures de l’honneur” could be great. John Phillips 130 do) anything and everything (lying, betraying supporters, etc.) to attain and maintain his position and power. He is quite different than R. 44 . In the first part (59-76), with R. dead, Louis XIII dying, and everyone expecting “persécutions” and purges of R.’s people, L. continued to see whether there could be a way to continue working with Anne (59) until it became clear she had been won over by M.. Louis XIII still did not trust Anne, so he followed M.’s plan to limit her power in the Regency, but M. then had to justify his participation in this plan to Anne, which he did 45 , but not in front of her former loyalists (61), that is, not in the presence of L. and people like him who had remained faithful to Anne 46 . Thus L. marked the beginning of his clear recognition of M.’s plotting to isolate Anne from those on whom she had depended. Since Anne and Gaston were vying for control of the Regency, since all expected great changes and to profit from them, the “intérêts” of all required choosing one of the two “partis”. As L. worked (62) discreetly to win Condé over to Anne’s “parti”, Louis XIII, near death, granted clemency (63) to Vendôme, his two sons, Bellegarde, Bassompierre, and many other nobles, with the result that the Court was filled 47 with those who had suffered under R. and who had had “liaisons” with Anne, which they assumed she would still value 48 after the deaths of R. and Louis XIII, much as L. himself assumed (63). Thus L. and other nobles were quite reasonably anticipating beneficial changes. These anticipations were reinforced when Anne named Beaufort 49 as the “gouverneur” of her sons Louis XIV and Anjou (63). These assumptions also perhaps explained L.’s actions when Anne (64) asked him 50 to take the side of Beaufort against La Meilleraye in a Court controversy. Although he had intended to side with La Meilleraye, L. followed Anne’s order to support Beaufort (thus making a temporary compromise against a friend for a future benefit) and, to help Anne, also agreed to visit M. so that Louis XIII would see that Anne was not preventing her “serviteurs” (64-65) from seeing Louis XIII’s first minister. L. however was by now suspicious of Anne’s reasons (65) (though he suspected she may not have known her own reasons), but all that he had 44 Kossmann (p. 7) says such comparisons of the two at this period were common. 45 See for example Kleinman, 248-249. 46 Kleinman 258 describes this as “Aux plus anciens de ses amis… elle s’abstint de dévoiler l’ensemble de ses projets.” 47 See for example Chevallier Louis XIII 635. 48 See for example Kleinman 237. 49 See for example Kleinman 255-256. 50 And he claimed that she hid less from him than from others: “Elle me cachait moins qu’aux autres l’état de son esprit, parce que, n’ayant point eu d’intérêts que les siens, elle ne doutait pas que je ne suivisse ses sentiments.” Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 131 described up to this point about his own actions fit the picture of a noble who had been, and remained, loyal to Anne and who assumed, as did many nobles, that she would in fact be the same person she had presented herself to be for all the years she was isolated and without much power. L. also (65) re-stated his guidelines for what he included in, or omitted from, his account. L., after setting the general scene, narrated the developments at Court after (66) Louis XIII died. Anne, the Regent, immediately retained, to the astonishment of all 51 , M., and M. (one of whose first acts was to betray Chavigny 52 despite their friendship) immediately changed the composition of the Queen’s inner circle (66) to favor himself. This shocked all the nobility 53 , at least in part because it seemed to mean 54 a continuation of the policies of R., from which Anne herself had suffered. Anne granted 55 L. his first “grâce”, the return to Court of the exiled Miossens, and gave him many signs of friendship, etc., and told him that her “honneur” was involved in her obligation to repay (66) him, (though L. may have stressed Anne’s emphatic insistence on her obligations in order to highlight his later disappointment when she ultimately did not live up to her promises). When Beaufort, in opposition to Anne and to M., drew many to his side, L. was not among them, so Anne was able to continue to speak freely to L. concerning, for example, her reservations about recalling Chevreuse to Court. In an attempt to (67) reveal to Anne what he saw as the dangers if she acted in certain ways, as well as to make clear to her his loyalty, L. explained that harshness toward Chevreuse (faithful to Anne through many misfortunes) would upset Anne’s loyalists. This frankness seemed to make Anne irritated, but she permitted L., who still had some influence over her, to escort Chevreuse back (67). Thus despite his reservations and the unexpected turn of events, L. continued in his role of loyal follower of Anne. The Court situation was such (67) that a cabal of people (the “Importants”) formed around Beaufort against M. 56 . L. was still on the side of Anne and of the 51 See for example Kleinman 236ff, 264. 52 Jean-Marie Constant (Bluche Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle “Chavigny” 318) thinks his rivalry with M. led to his removal, and Kleinman 264-265 says Anne asked him to withdraw in part because he knew too much about things Anne would prefer were forgotten. 53 Kleinman 259 “…mais elle (=Anne) agit avec une telle circonspection que le seul à deviner ses intentions fut l’ancien secrétaire d’État Brienne”. 54 See for example Kleinman 267. 55 During this period she seems to have been generous in her grants of positions, favors, etc.; see for example Kleinman 271. 56 See for example Kleinman 262. John Phillips 132 nobility (although less securely so in the case of Anne), and so (67-68) it was his misfortune to be the friend in many of this cabal, since despite his not approving their plans, they deemed any visits to M. a “crime”. L. however, because totally dependent on Anne, had no choice but to accede to Anne’s request to meet with M. (68), though he got Anne to agree to allow him to tell M. that his support was contingent upon M.’s continued support for Anne. L. then could agree to do what Anne asked but also maintain his independence. He advised Chevreuse that Anne had changed, so she would be mistaken to allow Anne to think that she was returning with the idea of controlling her; he also explained that, as M. was accused of no “crime”, was not a part of the “violences” of R., was skilled in foreign affairs, and had (68) no relatives in France, Chevreuse would be well advised to accept M.’s overtures, especially as there was no one to replace him 57 . However, because the situation (partly created by Anne acting against virtually everyone’s expectations) continued to move both sides further apart, Chevreuse did not act (69) on his advice but thought she could act against her enemies and so destroy M. Her plan included having Anne recompense L.’s loyalty by taking Le Havre (69) from R.’s relatives and giving it to L. Anne agreed, but no longer could do such a thing without M.’s consent. L. by this time suspected that M., trying (70) to harm him, stalled and engaged in much hypocritical talk 58 , all in order to make it seem that Chevreuse had put Anne in the unfavorable position of not being able to repay loyal servants. M. (according to the narrator, L.) knew that L. only wished to be useful to Anne and was not seeking any positions for himself (70). But as Anne made L. more complicated counter offers and as he noticed that she spoke less and less openly to him, it became very clear (70) that Anne was now M.’s accomplice in holding him back. When Anne proposed the position held by Gassion, which all knew (71) Hautefort claimed for a brother, L. turned it down. However he did not reject this because (as Hepp claims), being chivalrous, he was deferring to Hautefort, but in order to show that he had been denied his due by Anne and M., and that he understood Anne’s offers to be part of a stalling tactic. This was another of 57 It is interesting that in L.’s version of his talk with Chevreuse, he seemed almost to go out of his way to get Chevreuse to not form a negative view of M., perhaps in part from loyalty to Anne. 58 This was perhaps part of a general plan on M.’s part to have Anne exercise greater control over her contacts and her generosity, in effect part of his “education” of her; see for example Kleinman 272-273. Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 133 (70) 59 M.’s manipulative, insincere actions, not a genuine offer meant to fairly recompense him, a noble, for his loyal service, and L. saw that clearly. L. seemed to agree with Chevreuse (71) that much of this was M.’s attempt to get Anne used to denying things to Chevreuse, thereby publicly weakening Chevreuse and alienating her supporters. L. seemed surer than ever that Anne had been moved almost beyond his reach. Another incident further showed both how much Anne was moving away and M. was consolidating his power. M. won over Gaston by paying his debts and by promising La Rivière the cardinal’s hat. L. had already helped to win Condé over to Anne’s side, and in the affair (73-74) of the “lost letter” he was able to aid Condé’s “maison” and his own friend Coligny. But when Mme de Montbazon was forced to publicly apologize, Chevreuse, Beaufort, and the “Importants” took this as their “disgrâce” (74). M. then took advantage of this by arresting Beaufort (for plotting against M.’s life) and by exiling Chevreuse to Tours (75). Now M. saw that he was in complete control (75): the Court was submissive, many had been exiled, Beaufort was in prison, the “Importants” scattered. Anne continued some ties of friendship to L. but L. saw that she had come too much under M.’s influence to be able to maintain, or to act on, any favorable feelings for L.. As L. was now the only friend of Chevreuse not disgraced, M., as his next step, determined to cause L. either to disappoint Anne or to abandon Chevreuse (75). To achieve this (75-76), M. asked Anne to manipulate her attachment to L. in such a way that L. would no longer see Chevreuse and would in fact become M.’s friend. When, in response to Anne requesting this, L. explained that Chevreuse had not deserved the treatment she received (75), Anne (76) agreed without apparent objection. But M., upset by her response, made her express her disapproval to L., and this was the beginning of L.’s full realization that things had substantially changed 60 . As a result he could no longer keep hoping that Anne would become what he 59 “Le Cardinal, par un artifice qu’il a depuis mis en usage en tant d’occasions, voulut me donner d’autres vues en la place de celles que j’avais et me faire abandonner le Havre, qu’on m’avait promis, pour des espérances éloignées dont il aurait pu aisément empêcher le succès. Il savait que j’avais répondu, sur les propositions de Mme d’Aiguillon, que je ne demandais ni le Havre ni les galères, que je croyais seulement que la Reine me destinerait à ce qui serait le plus utile à son service et que c’était ce que j’accepterais par préférence.” 60 “La Reine ne me parut pas blessée sur l’heure de cette réponse; mais, comme le Cardinal la trouva trop mesurée, il la lui fit désapprouver, et je reconnus, par une longue suite de mauvais traitements, que ce que je lui avait dit m’avait entièrement ruiné auprès d’elle.” John Phillips 134 had expected her to be and what she claimed she still was; now he would need to actively oppose her. As a counter to the claim that L. wished to glorify himself as a “chevalier sans peur et sans reproche”, the “dévot chevalier-servant de la reine” Anne, it is useful to consider several relevant incidents included at this point. When (75-76) immediately after his talk with Anne, L. noted Chevreuse’s ingratitude (after he had continued, at some risk, his relations with her, as he had promised Anne) it led him to remark on what he perceived as the on-going ingratitude of Anne, even though she was in fact perfectly able (as the Régente) to show him the gratitude he felt he deserved. This same sensitivity to ingratitude perhaps led to the inclusion here (77) of the Montrésor incident 61 . It was Montrésor who here (77-78) failed to acknowledge his gratitude to L., who had in effect bent over backwards to accommodate what he calls the “servitude ridicule” needed to determine how exactly to act toward La Rivière without offending Gaston or Montrésor. It is noteworthy that L.’s characterization of these aulic gymnastics as “servitude ridicule” shows that he had been more than simply uncritically accepting of all the Court protocols. Thus by emphasizing an important aspect of gratitude (namely, the failure of a person to honor obligations to those who had honored their obligations), L. highlighted how completely in his eyes Anne (now fully on the side of M.) had changed her relationship to him. And by aligning these three incidents of ingratitude (Anne’s, Chevreuse’s, and Montrésor’s) at this point L. makes it easier for the reader to see this as L. saw it, as part of the rather predictable fallout form the various political changes at Court than any attempt by L. to enhance his image. By the beginning of the second part (76-89) of Mémoires II, L. has gradually been forced to conclude that no reconciliation would any longer be possible; he would not ever again have the position with Anne he had had and which he was being told by Anne he still had, and he explicitly acknowledged this. Now he was openly against Anne and M. Since Anne (78) would not help him enter the army, he would have to find another way to do so, for now she denied him the (78) positions she had earlier asked him not to take (55). It is here (78) that he openly states 62 that, because of 61 As a friend of Montrésor he is asked to snub Gaston’s favorite, La Rivière, which enrages Gaston, who complains to L.’s father, who asks L. to change. L. seeks permission from Montrésor, who is offended, though it is Montrésor who is indebted to L. 62 “Tant d’inutilité et tant de dégoûts me donnèrent enfin d’autres pensées, et me firent chercher des voies périlleuses pour témoigner mon ressentiment à la Reine et au cardinal Mazarin.” Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 135 his feelings of uselessness and displeasure he would seek more dangerous routes to show Anne and M. his “ressentiment”. Having tried often to maintain his good relations with Anne and having often been stifled, having seen Anne change greatly and M. consolidate his power, having recognized they were actively trying to harm (76) him, he would now proceed openly against them both. It was also here 63 that he presented his rather cynical description of his relations (78-79) with Condé’s sister, Mme de Longueville, and related the “deal” he struck with Miossens 64 . This manœuvre apparently had the desired effect, as he was soon with Condé’s army, which thereafter won the famous victory (79) at Mardyk, after which L., seriously wounded, returned to Paris. L.’s treatment of Mme de Longueville will have to be judged on its own merits, and L. does not seem interested in apologizing for his behavior nor in presenting it as anything but what it was. And there is no intent in this paper to state or to imply that L.’s actions with regard to Longueville are in any way even partially explained or excused by his treatment at the hands of Anne and M. However, the behavior he described here continued to fit the portrait of a noble who, observing the actions of the government against the nobility in general and himself in particular, decided that he would no longer accept this treatment but would act against it, with the additional element that this particular noble had no scruples 63 Delpeche (for some reason) (61) thinks that the seduction of Mme de Longueville here (78) is an example of the “choses extraordinaires et éclatantes” (mentioned earlier (50) by L. in the passage about taking Anne to Bruxelles) because it is “…bien faite pour tenter un ambitieux”. She also sees it as L.’s opportunity to get revenge: “…animé par le désir de prendre sa revanche non seulement sur la reine mais sur la vie qui le maltraitait depuis longtemps”. Thus there would be nothing in this about the political forces at work, about the emphasis L. has placed on the nobility. Rather L., worried because of “…le gaspillage de ses jeunes années… espérait que la gloire de cette liaison ferait oublier, aux autres et à lui-même, les échecs du passé”. 64 “La beauté de Mme de Longueville…(Longueville) si unie avec toute sa maison et si tendrement aimée du duc d’Enghien son frère, qu’on pouvait se répondre de l’estime et de l’amitié de ce prince quand on était approuvé de Madame sa sœur. Beaucoup de gens tentèrent inutilement cette voie…Miossens… s’y opiniâtra le plus longtemps…J’étais de ses amis particuliers…et j’eus enfin sujet de croire que je pourrais faire un usage plus considérable que Miossens de l’amitié et de la confiance de Mme de Longueville. Je l’en fis convenir lui-même…je lui dis mes vues, mais que sa (= Miossens) considération me retiendrait toujours et que je n’essayerais point de prendre des liaisons avec Mme de Longueville, si il ne m’en laissait la liberté. J’avoue même que je l’aigris exprès contre elle, pour l’obtenir… Il me la donna tout entière; mais il se repentit de me l’avoir donnée quand il vit les suites de cette liaison.” John Phillips 136 about openly exploiting Mme de Longueville for her relationship to Condé and the way he could benefit from this to get his revenge on M. and Anne. It is difficult to believe however that the future author of the Maximes could include such an incident without realizing that it would reflect unfavorably on him, that it would harm the image he is alleged to be so carefully cultivating, namely as a “chevalier sans peur et sans reproche” , the “dévot chevalier-servant de la reine” Anne. L. ends Mémoires II (79-89) by describing the final events which led to his complete alienation from Anne and M. and ready to join the civil war as the best way to get his revenge. For the purposes of this paper, the most significant event here was the question of the granting of the tabouret. Everyone had tired (79) of M.’s government, his tricks, his weaknesses and bad faith, the disorders, the fiscal demands, etc., all of which M. felt he could get away with because he had recognized the kingdom’s slavish nature (80) and because he controlled (80) Anne and Gaston. The general hatred of M. continued to grow, and all were desirous of change. After Condé’s victory at Lens (80) M., hating the Parliament, was happy to use this victory against the state itself and also to get revenge against the Parliament. M. knew (81) 65 that Anne had offered L. various honors and the “tabouret”, and M. himself promised L. these very same things. L. had gone, as ordered (81) 66 , to Poitou, and having done what he was ordered to do, and what was in fact his duty, learned that, contrary to doing what he explicitly had promised, M. had given these promised “lettres” of nobility to six other nobles and did not “remember” L. L. was very angry, and quite justifiably so, as most scholars would agree that for a noble something absolutely essential was at stake here 67 . It seems odd that Hepp would claim 65 “…il me paraissait que le Cardinal voulait quelquefois me ménager et qu’il feignait de désirer mon amitié; il savait que la Reine s’était engagée à moi, dans tous les temps, de donner à ma maison les mêmes avantages qu’on accordait à celles de Rohan et de La Trémouille et à quelques autres; ...J’en parlai au Cardinal en partant; il me promit positivement de me l’accorder dans peu de temps, mais qu’à mon retour j’aurais les premières lettres de duc qu’on accorderait, afin que ma femme eût cependant le tabouret.” 66 “J’allai en Poitou, comme j’ai dit, dans cette attente, et j’y pacifiai les désordres; mais j’appris que bien loin de me tenir les paroles que le Cardinal m’avait données, il avait accordé des lettres de duc à six personnes de qualité sans se souvenir de moi.” 67 Labatut does not agree with Hepp (134-135) that this is a “futile affaire du tabouret refusé à une épouse qu’il ne comble pas d’égards” but rather that it is of “une importance primordiale” for L.. Though Labatut relies (202-204) on L.’s Apologie for some of his comments, he is in accord with most scholars in saying that for any noble, and here for L., it is a question of “droits de recevoir des Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 137 that L.’s considerable concern for obtaining these very rare, highly coveted honors would somehow be invalidated by the fact that, according to Hepp, he, in effect, did not love his wife enough. This would seem to imply that these and similar honors were only sought for family members based on the affection one had for them, and not on the desire to raise the status of one’s “maison“ etc., an opinion that probably would be difficult to support. And it was at this point that he heard from Mme de Longueville about the plan for the “guerre civile” (81) 68 , which consoled him because it gave him the marques de prééminence sociale” which were simply essential to the identity of the noble, and the tabouret was a “signe matériel de prééminence”. L. had been Anne’s “serviteur particulier” and had sacrificed much, and she had both entrusted her life to him but also given to her “chevalier servant” many “espérances”, and L.’s “attitude pendant la Fronde” is in many ways to be understood to be due to “le refus d’Anne d’Autriche et de Mazarin de tenir les promesses qu’ils lui avaient faites”. Labatut thinks that L. well knew that he was not simply owed this distinction for his wife (“…Marsillac sait qu’on ne lui refuse pas un droit strict…”), but it is something which had been promised to L. and during a period when “une pluie des grâces tombait sur des gens de qualité bien contestable”. The failure to follow through was thus on the part of Anne “un grave manque de délicatesse et de reconnaissance”, and in addition showed on M.’s part “une grave méconnaissance du caractère de grandeur fondamentale attachée à la famille du prince de Marsillac”. It was not something which was related only to L.’s “mérites”, but it was a question of “qualité” which was “…liée à l’illustration de son père, de sa famille…” And in fact (372-374) the Assemblée de la Noblesse of September 1649 was “…organisée par Mazarin pour dresser le plus grand nombre possible contre les prétentions au tabouret de quelques grandes familles soutenues par les princes de Condé et de Conti”, including of course L., because he wanted to “…affaiblir la puissance du vainqueur du Rocroi sur le plan intérieur”. This then would serve to reinforce L.’s sense that Anne and M. were actively working against him, though the Assemblée itself had nothing in particular against L. and was simply alarmed at what it saw as an excessive granting of privileges. And so though M. is successful in blocking L.’s wishes on this occasion, the “…assemblée n’a pas obtenu satisfaction, en dépit des promesses faites par le gouvernement…” because “…des tabourets ont continué à être distribués abusivement” which presumably would not have pleased L. if he knew. On this matter see also J. Truchet, who says (p. XI) “Ne soyons pas surpris de le voir, comme son père lui en avait donné l’exemple, soutenir de longs procès pour des questions de préséance, et s’engager dans la Fronde parce qu’il n’avait pu obtenir le tabouret pour son épouse: il pense en cela faire son devoir.” See also Jouanna Devoir 264. 68 “J’étais dans le premier mouvement qu’un traitement si extraordinaire me devait causer, lorsque j’appris par Mme de Longueville que tout le plan de la guerre civile s’était fait et résolu a Noisy, entre le prince de Conti, le duc de Longeville, le coadjuteur de Paris et les plus considérables de Parlement… Cette nouvelle me John Phillips 138 chance to get revenge on Anne and M. (82) 69 . He could only obtain his leave (82) from M. and Anne by promising to make no complaints about how he was treated and to surrender all his claims, which further embittered him. Once in Paris, he was busy organizing the forces opposed to M. and the Crown, and he says Mme de Longueville even created delays (82) to allow him time to arrive in a position to exercise some control. The rest of the narration concerns the different preparations by the sides in the civil war, the only basis of which was a general hatred (86-87) of M., and, after L. was again seriously wounded, ends with the peace of Rueil. L. has given much thought to what he was trying to do in Mémoires I and II. It does not seems that he was trying to show how he first valiantly strove to be the “chevalier sans peur et sans reproche”, the “dévot chevalierservant de la reine” Anne, failed, then abandoned and betrayed this ideal, and instead helped stir up, then actively participated in, a civil war. There is much more evidence for viewing this as a very careful presentation by L. of how he, a noble, was in effect left no choice but to take up the noble “cause” against the state’s encroachments (first in the person of R. and then in that of M.) on the power and prestige of the nobility. Because L. wished to focus very intently on the steps leading up to his decisions and actions, his narrative is almost only concerned with those events which contributed to understanding his choices, and he included very many of these. R. and M. play very similar roles because of their positions in the government, but L.’s lack of respect for M. was quite pronounced and not disguised, whereas he had considerable appreciation for R.’s achievements despite the toll they took on the nobility. One might almost say that L. presents these events as the story of how, reluctantly, he had to change his opinion of, and relation to, Anne as she changed her relationship to him as her own power and position improved at Court with the death of Louis XIII and her alliance with M.. But L. has given plenty of evidence to read this as what might be viewed as a typical noble reaction to a significant threat to the nobility’s power at this moment in history 70 . consola de mon chagrin, et je me vis en état de faire sentir à la Reine et au cardinal Mazarin qu’il leur eût été utile de m’avoir ménagé.” 69 “…je sentis un grand plaisir de voir qu’en quelque état que la dureté de la Reine et la haine du Cardinal eussent pu me réduire, il me restait encore des moyens de me venger d’eux.” Jouanna (Devoir 225-226), though speaking of an earlier period, sees the actions of L. here, and also the similar actions of Bussy-Rabutin, as typical for a noble expressing his “mécontentement”. 70 It goes without saying that this paper is only concerned with explicating what exactly L. is trying to do and how, and is not concerned with whether he is justified in writing what he writes. Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires I-II 139 Works Cited Bluche, François. 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